

JPRS-TND-94-004
11 February 1994



JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-94-004

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11 February 1994

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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China Asks Nuclear States To Aim for Weapons Destruction

OW2201142594 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service
in Chinese 1126 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By reporter Gao Jian (7559 1017)]

[Text] United Nations, 21 Jan (XINHUA)—A Chinese representative said here today that only by making a definite commitment to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and by adopting appropriate and resolute steps to that end will the measures of nuclear states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have a genuine significance.

The second session of the preparatory committee for the 1995 conference of parties to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was convened this week at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Sha Zukang, head of the Chinese delegation to the session expounded China's views on how to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Sha Zukang said China recognizes the importance of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the maintenance of an effective international legal mechanism for that purpose. At the same time, China also believes that nonproliferation by itself is not the ultimate goal that the mankind should pursue, and that the real objective should be complete prohibition, thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and realization of a nuclear-free world.

Sha Zukang believes that only by making a definite commitment and by adopting appropriate and resolute steps to

that end will the measures of nuclear states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have a genuine significance. He said failure to do that will perpetuate the defect of the existing imbalance in the treaty in the rights and obligations between the nuclear and nonnuclear states. To realize quickly the objective of the total prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, a large number of nonnuclear countries have given up the option of acquiring and developing nuclear weapons; however, their demand for security guarantees has not been fundamentally satisfied.

Sha Zukang said the Chinese Government believes that conditions are ripe for all nuclear states to make the commitment of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and nuclear free zones.

Sha Zukang criticized some big nuclear powers for a lack of sincerity for peace in this respect. He said if nuclear states, particularly the big nuclear powers with global nuclear attack capability, are unable to take even the limited step of guaranteeing that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and nuclear free zones, how can they expect the large number of nonnuclear states to trust their sincerity for peace.

He pointed out that it will be difficult to ensure universality and enduring effectiveness for the international nuclear nonproliferation mechanism if nuclear states only make one-sided emphasis on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and if they only emphasize their own absolute security to the neglect of the nonnuclear states' legitimate security concerns.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Kim Shows 'Stronger Desire' To Improve Relations With North

SK2001062594 Seoul YONHAP in English
0610 GMT 20 Jan 94

[By Kim Tae-yong]

[Text] Seoul, Jan 20 (YONHAP)—President Kim Yong-sam's view of North Korea and unification seems little different from those of his predecessors, but he does have a stronger desire to improve inter-Korean relations than they did.

Kim clarified this view on Thursday, after a policy briefing from Unification Minister Yi Yong-tok.

In the current international situation, where every country is competing fiercely, the Korean people cannot survive unless they realize unification as soon as possible, he told Yi.

Kim instructed his minister to develop inter-Korean relations so that a South-North Korean commonwealth is established during his term in office, which ends in February 1998.

Although he is eager to see inter-Korean relations improved, he has one condition: Settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem.

"The government should solve the nuclear problem, which is blocking improvement of inter-Korean relations, this year without fail to revitalize inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation," he told Yi.

Once the nuclear problem is solved, the government should push ahead with the promotion of mutual interests and improvement of relations, Kim said.

"First of all, the government should make a breakthrough in solving the nuclear problem through an exchange of special envoys, and then it should push ahead with exchange and cooperation with North Korea," he said.

Inter-Korean relations were cool last year because of the suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development program.

Kim told Yi that he was sure that North Korea had no choice but to change its policies soon, and said that the government should use the change as an opportunity to improve inter-Korean relations.

Since North Korea is in a very difficult situation at home and abroad, it cannot avoid changing its policies. When North Korea begins to show a willingness to solve the nuclear problem, the international situation surrounding the Korean peninsula will change rapidly, he said.

The government should use the change for a stable improvement in inter-Korean relations and, ultimately, to realize peaceful unification.

"For those goals, the National Unification Board should push ahead with diverse inter-Korean talks and North Korea policies," Kim said.

He reassured Yi that he will not seek absorption like in Germany, but warned him that the people should guard against sentimental theories of unification.

JAPAN

Tokyo Supports 'Indefinite, Unconditional Extension' of NPT

OW2201044094 Tokyo KYODO in English
1312 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] New York, Jan 21 KYODO—Japan supports an indefinite, unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) beyond its 1995 expiration since it will promote peaceful use of nuclear power, its ambassador in charge of disarmament said Friday [21 January].

Yoshitomo Tanaka made the remarks in a speech at the UN headquarters at a meeting of the preliminary committee preparing for a 1995 international conference to discuss extension of the pact.

As reasons for Japan's support, Tanaka noted the treaty calls for nuclear powers to reduce nuclear arms and promotes the prevention of nuclear proliferation, a major concern in the post-Cold War era.

The NPT, which came into force in 1970, requires nuclear powers to sincerely promote disarmament talks and bans nonnuclear states from producing or possessing nuclear arms.

Japan became party to the NPT in 1975.

The preliminary committee was set up to promote working-level consultations before an international conference in 1995.

So far, 60 countries have expressed support for unlimited extension of the treaty.

But nonaligned nations, mostly Asian and African developing countries, have demanded that revisions be made in the treaty's clauses and that extension be set for a limited period, saying the treaty is discriminatory between nuclear powers and nonnuclear countries.

A majority of support with 162 signatories is needed to extend the treaty.

NORTH KOREA

Russian Intelligence Official Says Pyongyang Froze Nuclear Program

SK1501052094 Seoul YONHAP in English
0458 GMT 15 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan 15 (YONHAP)—North Korea was on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon when it stopped its nuclear program because of the mounting outside pressure and overwhelming cost, a senior Russian intelligence officer is quoted as saying by MOSCOW NEWS [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI].

"North Korea was determined in its plan for military application of nuclear technology, and according to our assessment it was near success," Lt. Gen. Gennady Evstafiev, director-general of massive destruction weapon control bureau of the external intelligence office, says in an interview with the weekly in Friday's edition.

Pyongyang froze its nuclear development program for two reasons, however, because of the international pressure and the recognition that it could no longer afford the enormous financial burden, Evstafiev says.

As a result, he says, the communist regime may give up its nuclear program altogether and go entirely public on its nuclear sites.

The intelligence officer points out that extra care is needed so as not to upset the sensitive political situation of North Korea, which is in the middle of a power transfer.

Moscow agrees with international experts on the gravity of the North Korean nuclear problem, he says, adding that Pyongyang's leaders have long sought to manufacture nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and have already succeeded in developing a delivery systems by modifying Scud missiles into the Nodong-1.

Evstafiev names North Korea the most dangerous country in the world, with the potential to make nuclear weapons. Next on his list are Israel, India and Pakistan.

He says Pyongyang is playing a big game with Washington in their "nuclear dialogue" and Moscow has therefore to put its national interests first to guarantee safety in the Far East.

Source Claims Pyongyang Hiding Nuclear Bombs Underground

SK2201010194 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
22 Jan 94 p 2

[YONHAP from Beijing]

[Text] According to a Chinese source on 21 January, North Korea has been secretly extracting a considerable amount of plutonium while it held nuclear negotiations with the United States, and that it is highly possible that North Korea has already produced a small nuclear bomb and is hiding it in an underground warehouse.

This source well versed in North Korean affairs said: "I recently heard from a senior North Korean official that North Korea is hiding nuclear weapons in an underground warehouse in the mountains near Pyongyang and that any thorough inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities [haek isol] by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency will fail to locate them."

SOUTH KOREA

Internationalization of Nuclear Pact Viewed

SK1801092494 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
18 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Kim Cha-su: "Turning the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Into an International Treaty"]

[Text] The Foreign Ministry feels nervous about minimizing the stir regarding the report that the United States is calling on the ROK to turn the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into an international treaty. It seems the Foreign Ministry is concerned about a breakup of the cooperative system with the United States, which may take place during the final stage of the U.S.-North Korean negotiations.

The Government's Position

The government opposes the U.S. proposal to turn the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into an international treaty. That is, the government contends that because the joint declaration of denuclearization signed in 1992 is not a treaty between countries but an agreement signed within the nation, the government does not need to turn it into an international treaty.

The government believes the issue of North Korea constantly keeping nuclear reprocessing facilities, even after adopting the joint declaration of denuclearization, should be resolved through North-South dialogue. In other words, the government believes that the government should persuade North Korea to destroy the nuclear reprocessing facilities through the Joint Nuclear Control Committee and, then, abide by the joint declaration of denuclearization.

A government official explained that "the U.S. proposal to turn the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into an international treaty is a result of considering North Korea's demand for a guarantee that a nuclear preemptive strike on the DPRK will not take place." That is, there is a possibility that because North Korea indeed regards as serious a nuclear threat from the United States and others, it may stick to nuclear development. Thus, in order to ease North Korea's threat, it is necessary for the nuclear-possessing countries to promise not to conduct a nuclear attack on North Korea.

Government officials have analyzed that the United States is intending to supplement the weak points of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by turning the joint declaration of denuclearization into an international treaty. The current NPT regulations stipulate that NPT member countries can have nuclear reprocessing facilities and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] are only required of the plutonium produced from the nuclear reprocessing process. Accordingly, if the joint declaration of denuclearization is turned into an international treaty, North and South Korea cannot have nuclear reprocessing facilities so suspicions of nuclear development on the Korean peninsula will be fully abolished. There was a (Tulatert) protocol signed by South American countries, including Brazil and Argentina, in 1967 in which the nuclear-possessing countries acknowledged the contents that had been agreed upon by the relevant countries.

At that time, when the South American countries resolved not to develop and possess nuclear weapons, they called on the nuclear-possessing countries, including the United States, to acknowledge the guarantee of refraining from a nuclear attack on them. Thus, the nuclear-possessing countries turned the agreement into an international treaty through a protocol.

It can be said that the United States has tried to apply this precedent to the Korean peninsula. [passage omitted]

Seoul Opposes Internationalization of N-S Nuclear Pact

*SK1801012394 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
18 Jan 94 p 1*

[Text] The government has decided to oppose a measure promoted by the United States of turning a joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula into an international treaty in an effort to block North Korea's nuclear development.

On 17 January an official concerned of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that "a joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is not an act between countries [kukka kanui haengwi] and it is, therefore, impossible to turn it into an international treaty," adding "the issue of nuclear reprocessing facilities on the Korean peninsula should be solved between North and South Korea."

The official continued: "The government's policy is that if the radiochemical laboratory North Korea possesses now turns out to be a small-scale nuclear reprocessing facility it will persuade North Korea, through the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee, to close the facility and abide by the joint declaration of denuclearization."

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

SISA JOURNAL Assesses Japan's DPRK Policy

SK1801075594 Seoul SISA JOURNAL in Korean
20 Jan 94 pp 45-46

[By Han Chong-ho]

[Text] Recently the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued a report entitled, "Looking Back on the International Situation and Its Prospects." This report sums up the diplomacy of 1993 and elucidates diplomatic goals for 1994. This report says that the greatest diplomatic tasks for this year are improving U.S.-Japan relations and dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue. In particular, if North Korea agrees to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency's complete inspection at the U.S.-North Korea negotiations, Japan and North Korea will resume working-level contacts in Beijing which was suspended since the eighth Japan-North Korea negotiations in November 1992.

The Japan-North Korea talks which started in January 1991 discussed issues including the issue of compensation for the war crimes committed by Japan. These issues were discussed prior to discussing the establishment of diplomatic relations. When the Japanese side brought up the issue of Yi Un-hye (the Japanese instructor to former North Korean terrorist Kim Hyon-hui who was responsible for the bombing of the Korean Air Lines plane in 1983), the North Korean side left the negotiating table and talks have been suspended since. Japan proposed resuming talks on many occasions, but the North Koreans rejected it each time. A Japanese source in Seoul said: "The Japanese Embassy in Beijing frequently telephones the North Korean Embassy in Beijing on meeting, but the North Korean side continues to reject our proposal."

A Japanese diplomat who assumed office in Beijing in July 1993 has not yet exchanged greetings with the North Korean side. North Korea only recognizes the United States as a counterpart to dialogue and has even left out the ROK. Therefore, the Japanese Government is not hastening to resume the Japan-North Korea talks and is maintaining a position of observing U.S.-North Korea negotiations.

However, the Japanese side is becoming active again. On 28 December 1993, Japanese Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata revealed a desire to resume negotiations with North Korea by using the issue of compensation as a starting point. Also on 9 January, on his way home from visiting China he held a news conference and openly proposed to the North Korean side that negotiations be resumed. Compensation is an issue because North Korea demands compensation for Japan's illegal colonialization of Korea which Japan insists that the Japanese annexation of Korea was legitimate and will only recognize property rights and claims of unpaid wages.

Japan has been experiencing difficulties in the talks because of North Korea's nuclear issue. It also revealed that if North Korea is willing, talks with North Korea may

be resumed at anytime. However there are doubts on whether Japan truly wants to achieve talks to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea.

Kim Pong-chin, professor at Japan's North Kyushu University, is in agreement with this claim. In a paper written for a scientific journal published at the National Unification Research Institute, he analyzed: "The greatest agenda in the Japan-North Korea negotiations to establish diplomatic relations is the issue of liquidating the past. The reason that North Korea is rejecting the talks is that Japan is intentionally neglecting internal tasks such as the issue of compensation by putting forth external elements such as the nuclear issue." Professor Kim continued: "Based on the Cold War era way of thinking, Japan is playing the role of proxy for the U.S. policy toward North Korea and is trying to advance its own interests to the utmost by taking advantage of the weak points and limitations of the ROK's North Korea policy."

Japan's situation on the issue of North Korea's nuclear issue is summarized as 'accepting reality as it is to establish countermeasures.' This theory is that a countermeasure must be provided to prevent nuclear development since a war may break out if sanctions are carried out toward North Korea. More than any other country, Japan is a country that generates the most rumors of danger on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it is peculiar for Japan to reach such a leisurely conclusion. What Japan is promoting from the level of 'taking measures' for nuclear development is the Theater Missile Defense plan. Japan claims that this is the interceptor system of North Korea's NODONG No. 1 missile, but the ROK experts think that Japan is using North Korea's threat to form a nuclear weapons transportation system.

With North Korea's nuclear problem an issue, Japan is able to favorably lead the Japan-North Korea negotiations towards establishing diplomatic relations and is using the nuclear issue to promote arms proliferation. Once the nuclear issue moves toward settlement, Japan will once again resort to liquidating the past to promote economic relations. Thus, Japan is showing flexibility in adapting to reality. This is the true nature of Japan's practical diplomacy toward the Korean peninsula.

The National Unification Board presented a report entitled "Current Situation and Prospect of Economic Relations Between Japan and North Korea" during parliamentary inspections of government offices last year. According to this report, Japan's post-war policy toward the Korean peninsula was fixed within the framework of U.S. policy on Korea. Since the mid-eighties, however, Japan has pursued practical diplomacy based on a policy of maintaining equal distance towards both South and North Korea under the pretext of the slogan, "Post-war liquidation with North Korea." This report assesses that Japan's strategy toward the Korean peninsula has two parts—the first aims at expanding political influence on the Korean peninsula by normalizing relations with North Korea, and

the second aims at promoting economic infiltration with capital and technology in the initiative to reorganize order in Northeast Asia.

North Korea and Japan have virtually restored relations although they have yet to formally establish diplomatic relations. In 1992, a government inspection team presented a surprising report after visiting various places in Japan to inspect cooperative relations between Japan and North Korea. This report reads: "Japanese businesses have already completed the planning and survey stage and have gained an understanding of North Korea's industrial situation, examined main projects for important areas of North Korea, and studied conditions for investment in North Korea. They are believed to have established personal relations with leading figures in North Korea—influential figures, provincial party officials, and managers of local industrial complexes. It is a matter of concern that the North Korean economy may become subject to that of Japan once diplomatic relations between the two are established."

Japan's Foreign Ministry Concerned About Information Leakage

Japan's East Asian Trade Institute and the Japan-North Korean Trade Association visited Pyongyang together on two occasions in April 1991 and July 1992 to discuss items that North Korea may want to develop and import. Experts are saying that the "tripartite trade route" connecting North Korea and Japan through the former Soviet Union and Hong Kong in the fifties and the sixties has been revived as the "tripartite investment route."

Likewise, Japan is disregarding the nuclear issue and steadily pushing ahead with work to expand its own interests in North Korea. The United States and the ROK will not intervene in Japan's affairs as long as Japan cooperates in the resolution of the nuclear issue and the improvement of South-North relations. In the beginning of the new year, ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu said that he would establish various diplomatic measures in preparation for the North Korean establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States and Japan. Regarding this, a ROK diplomat in Seoul said, "Japan must obtain ROK and U.S. consent before establishing diplomatic ties with North Korea. North Korea is well aware of this. Minister Han's remarks on ROK support in the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two means that the ROK is willing to conciliate North Korea with the Japan card in the last stage of negotiations for resolving the nuclear issue, and not that it will actually help in the establishment of North Korea-Japan diplomatic relations."

Reaching a resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue means the beginning of a new diplomatic war. Japan is preparing for a new strategy towards the Korean peninsula while ROK leaders dream sweet dreams of South-North dialogue, whose resumption remains distant.

On 28 December 1993, a visit to North Korea by a delegation of the Social Democratic Party of Japan [SDP]

led by dietman Hajime Hukata, director of the Organizational Department of the SDP Central Committee and executive officer of the Japan-DPRK Friendship Promotion League at the request of the Workers Party of Korea [WPK] generated interest from diplomatic circles. Hukata is a typical pro-North Korea politician who had visited North Korea on 28 September 1990 with Kanemaru, then-vice president of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, to realize the joint tripartite declaration. He met Hwang Chang-yop, secretary of the WPK and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, on 30 December. Hwang Chang-yop leads the work to establish diplomatic ties with Japan as the head of a special agency recently established by North Korea on re-establishing diplomatic relations with Japan.

Hukata's visit to North Korea, however, failed to interest ROK and Japanese media because an SDP dietman's visit to North Korea is not meaningful under the situation, in which the coalition ruling party's future is unclear. An official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "I observed Hukata's visit to North Korea with interest, but didn't find anything worth noticing."

Ever since the pro-North Korean SDP became the ruling party, the Japanese Foreign Ministry has become deep suspicious of the coalition ruling party's policy toward North Korea. An influential dietman of the Japan Renewal Party, Hajime Isihara, was the executive officer of the team to visit North Korea in 1990, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Kajimura, who controls key departments of the cabinet such as the Intelligence Office, the Foreign Policy Deliberation Office, and the Security Office, was the deputy executive officer of the delegation to North Korea. An unidentified Japanese foreign ministry official told the Japanese press that "It [the Foreign Ministry] cannot help but worry about possible information leakage since most of the Hosokawa regime's members are pro-North Korea."

Japan's diplomatic policy is influenced by government officials. Regarding this, an observer well-versed in Japanese affairs, said to keep an eye on Yutaka Kawashima, minister at the Japanese Embassy in the ROK from July 1992 until November 1993, when he was appointed director of the Foreign Ministry's Asia Department, the hub of Japan's foreign policy.

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

Reserve General Warns of 'Ecological Bomb' in Tuzla

AU2401114994 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in: Serbo-Croatian 21 Jan 94 p 7

[Interview with Professor Dr. Zlatko Bincenfeld, reserve Croatian Army general and adviser to Croatian Defense Minister, by Mate Piskor: "Tuzla and Vitez Are Ecological Bombs"]

[Excerpts] Reporting from the fronts in Croatia and later also from those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatian media on numerous occasions has alleged that the Serbian

and the Muslim forces have been using chemical agents banned since 1925 by international convention. However, there has been very little credible evidence and this has been the reason why the Croatian Army so far has not openly reported it, stresses Professor Dr. Zlatko Binenfeld, reserve general of the Croatian Army and the defense minister's adviser for research and military-technical development.

Piskor: General, your lecture on the application of chemical warfare in the clashes in the former Yugoslavia, which was given at Croatian Defense Ministry last week, has perplexed the public. Why did you present it to the public in such a shocking way and why only now?

Binenfeld: You see, I am a scientist and I always insist that each claim must be supported by the appropriate evidence. There had been no material evidence for the use of chemical agents in Croatia even though there was much talk about it. We have the evidence now and we are presenting it to the public. This involves an Oganj rocket filled with the CS [chlorobenzamalonitrile] chemical agent, which landed near Pokupski a year and a half ago and a hand grenade filled with the same chemical agent that was recently found near Zadar.

Shocking Information

Piskor: You have stated that the former Yugoslav National Army has approximately 100 tonnes of CS at its disposal. How great a danger does this represent?

Binenfeld: Before I give a specific answer, I must explain something. I have been studying the problems of protection from chemical agents for 42 years. I have lectured at the Military Medical Academy and the Military Technical Faculty in Zagreb, I was an adviser to the former Yugoslav Government on the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and a participant and lecturer at numerous international conventions on the use of and protection from chemical agents. Despite this, I did not know what the Yugoslav National Army was manufacturing in Bijelo Polje near Mostar. I thought that that they were manufacturing quantities of chemical agents that were only sufficient for protection tests, but in fact they manufactured large quantities. General Tus, the commander of the air force of the former Yugoslav National Army in Mostar, was not informed either, and not even the omniscient CIA had any such notion. [passage omitted]

Piskor: There is growing evidence that chemical agents are being used in the clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the Muslim forces are using it increasingly often against the Croats. What is your view?

Binenfeld: This whole business about the use of chemical agents in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I consider the use of

chlorine to be a chemical agent, started long ago with Silajdzic's statement that, if given no other choice, they would use chlorine as a weapon. He threatened to poison all Europe with chlorine and similar nonsense. Had he used the chlorine in Tuzla he would have killed his own people first, because a chemical agent kills unselectively, and especially pays no attention to ethnicity.

But they really do have 500 tonnes of chlorine in Tuzla and now comes the most dangerous bit about it. They have threatened to use chlorine against the Serbs and the Serbs have accused them of actually doing so. However, this is not certain because UN experts have found smoke boxes and not bombs filled with chlorine. However, they have used chlorine against the Croats several times.

When we started to receive the initial reports about the use of chlorine-filled bombs in Vitez and Busovaca, for a long time we would not allow this to be revealed to the public until we held what we considered evidence. Evidence means the name of a hospital, a date, the name and surname of the patient, date of birth, symptoms, a medical examination, therapy, and the seal and signature of the physician in charge. Unfortunately, there is plenty of such evidence published. We have not received a denial of a single one either from the Muslims, whom we were accusing, or from the UN Protection Force. [passage omitted]

Piskor: Grenades filled with chemical agents are being manufactured in Tuzla. However, is Tuzla dangerous just because of this?

Binenfeld: Precisely. The Sodaso factory in Tuzla is a real ecological bomb. I studied the Sodaso factory in autumn 1992. Bearing in mind that I obtained information about the exact quantities of chemicals that they possess from the factory itself, I informed all the important officials in the world about the danger. They have all acknowledged it but nobody has done a thing about it. I have informed the world that the approximately 60 tonnes of mercury in Tuzla presents a danger of contamination spreading via the Spreca River practically all the way to the Black Sea. The representative of Tuzla in Zagreb has openly threatened to do this. Bearing in mind that, apart from mercury, they have more than 150 tonnes of a chemical similar to the one in Bhopal, where a tenth of the quantity caused a huge ecological catastrophe and killed several thousands of people, it becomes clear why I have said that Sodaso is a real barrel of gunpowder. There is also a great quantity of hydrochloric acid and other acids. If an explosion occurred, lethal concentrations of acids would emerge. It is actually difficult to anticipate what would happen, how many people would perish, how many would be injured, and what the environment would be like afterward. It would be a catastrophe. I have proposed that these chemicals be transported somewhere safe, but, naturally, again without any success. [passage omitted]

ARGENTINA

Nation Signs Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

PY1901161794 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS
 ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1102 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Buenos Aires, 19 Jan (NA)—Argentine Vice Foreign Minister [title as received] Fernando Petrella stated that the ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile "will bring tranquillity not only to these countries but to the rest of the hemisphere, and to the international community as well."

Petrella stressed the system "of verification and transparency" signed by the three countries, and added that the opposite would have been "submitting Argentina to a system of separation and isolation that would have led it to lose the train of development in the nuclear area."

In remarks to a radio station, Petrella said the document ratifying the Tlatelolco Treaty by Argentina was submitted today in Mexico City by Foreign Policy Under Secretary Rogelio Pfrter.

However, so far Brazil has not ratified the treaty, although it had agreed with Argentina and Chile to simultaneously submit the documents.

"What happened was a little lack of synchronization, but Brazil will ratify the treaty, possibly in the course of the first quarter of this year," Petrella said.

The vice foreign minister denied that the Tlatelolco Treaty's ratification would reduce Argentine sovereignty in nuclear matters "because it is just a matter of preserving the country's current capacity, attained very well in the past."

"In this manner some situations will be whitewashed and we will be in a position to have access to technology that the National Atomic Energy Commission and the entire Argentine nuclear industry need," he said.

Petrella said: "Ukraine, which is a nuclear power, wants to stop being one, the same as the Czech Republic, and North Korea, a country with which the international community is negotiating."

"I would say that most countries will be members not only of the common agreements but of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as well, which Argentina hopes to join this year, as conveyed by the president," he said.

Petrella also stressed the "distrust" that existed among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile concerning the nuclear issue, "partly created by the origin of the Treaty for the Provision of Nuclear Weapons that has marked a sort of discrimination between those that could be nuclear powers and those that could not."

"Those countries that conducted a nuclear explosion before 1967 could become members, while all other

nations, some of which had tremendous industrial development, were left out," he said.

In that order he said: "That sort of discrimination has generated a distrust in countries that, in this manner, could not have access to technology that would allow them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

"This has demonstrated that the treaty was baseless because countries such as ours have broadly developed that technology without violating, by self-control, what the treaty prohibited," he said.

BRAZIL

Angra-1 Nuclear Plant Begins Reloading With New Fuel Rods

PY2501024694 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
 in Portuguese 24 Jan 94 p 10

[By Fatima Belchior]

[Text] Rio de Janeiro—Nuclear Industries of Brazil (INB) last Friday delivered to Furnas Centrais Eletricas the first eight fuel rods for the next fuel loading of the Angra-1 nuclear plant. By 6 February INB expects all 40 new fuel rods will be in the plant.

Angra-1 will be undergoing its fourth fuel replacement process, an operation that is usually made every 18 months. The plant, which discontinued operations in 1993, will be started in the middle of February according to the latest decision by the directorate of Furnas, which operates the nuclear plant.

Fuel rods are assembled at INB's Fuel Elements Factory (FEC) in Resende (Rio de Janeiro). Transportation between this city and Angra dos Reis (Rio de Janeiro) takes approximately six hours. During this first stage two fuel rods are being transported in each container, in four trucks.

Congress Urged To Approve Dual-Purpose Military Goods Bill

PY2501145794 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL
 in Portuguese 24 Jan 94 p 9

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi]

[Text] The government is waiting for Congress to approve a bill to establish controls on the export and import of dual-purpose military goods (for civilian and military purposes and directly linked services) prior to negotiating our entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an organization created by a group of countries in 1987 to control the export of technologies and systems that can contribute to the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Draft bill 2530/92, which is included in the executive branch message 36/92, has already been approved by the Chamber of Deputies Economy Committee and has a

preliminary favorable opinion of coordinator Fabio Feldmann, of the Consumer Defense, Environment, and Minorities Committee. His advisers state that the report will be finished by the end of the month and will be included the amendments proposed by the Navy Ministry last week. The draft was also sent to the National Defense, Science and Technology, and Constitution and Justice Committees.

Having been approved two by committees—because the Foreign Ministry already has the approval of the Environment Committee—the government will now ask for very urgent discussion of the bill using a procedure that sends the bill directly to the plenum without passing through other committees.

Diplomatic sources have stated that the government wants to increase Brazilian credibility before the international community. To become a member of the MTCR, Congress must first approve the bill controlling the export of dual-purpose materiel. Congress must also ratify the quadripartite nuclear safeguards agreement among Brazil, Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC), and the amendments to the Tlatelolco Treaty that ban nuclear weapons in Latin America. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee postponed voting on both items last week.

A diplomatic source commented: "Brazil's participation in the MTCR comes under the nonproliferation policy." By approving the bill, Brazil will be prohibited from passing technologies received from industrialized countries to countries considered untrustworthy, such as Iraq, North Korea, and Libya.

The bill sent to the Chamber of Deputies in August 1992 provides for the creation of an international importation certificate by which importers commit themselves to refrain from exporting certain goods without previous authorization of the appropriate Brazilian authorities. The bill also creates a delivery verification certificate to confirm the entry of the product into the importing country. The bill anticipates—under the jurisdiction of the president of the Republic—the creation of a permanent inter-ministerial commission comprising representatives of various ministries.

The position of executive secretary will be filled by the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (SAE).

In his preliminary report, Fabio Feldmann (PSDB-SP) [Brazilian Social Democracy Party - Sao Paulo] says: "Military materiel, such as ammunition and explosives in any of their diverse forms, require strict controls on their handling, transport, and storage."

CUBA

Study on Radiation Status Noted

*FL1401151894 Havana Radio Rebelde Network
in Spanish 1255 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Report by National News Agency correspondent Nieves Toledo]

[Text] According to the results of a study carried out by specialists from the Radiation Protection and Hygiene Center [Centro de Proteccion e Higiene de las Radiaciones] and the provincial delegations of the Executive Secretariat for Nuclear Affairs, Cuba has optimal radiological environmental conditions, favorable for any kind of human activity.

EGYPT

Minister Comments on Building Nuclear Plants*NC2301185294 Cairo MENA in Arabic
1635 GMT 23 Jan 94*

[Text] Cairo, 23 Jan (MENA)—Engineer Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy, has denied the presence of any pressure on Egypt not to implement the project of nuclear stations for generating electrical power.

The minister said before today's meeting of the People's Assembly Committee for Energy and Industry, chaired by Dr. Amin Mubarak, that the ministry is following up on the latest developments in nuclear stations around the world so that they will be ready at the appropriate time whenever a decision is reached to implement the nuclear stations.

Mahir Abazah added that the Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion restricted the expansion of many developed countries in the field of nuclear stations. Examples are the United States, Italy, and Germany.

The members of the committee had demanded that modern technology specializing in the use of nuclear reactors for generating electricity be introduced to deal with the rise in the price of electricity in Egypt. They noted that there are those who maintain that there are pressures on Egypt not to set up such stations.

INDIA

Official Outlines Country's Future Nuclear Program*BK2001135594 Delhi INDIAN EXPRESS in English
11 Jan 94 p 2*

[All figures as published]

[Text] Bangalore—India will continue to develop its nuclear energy programme, especially in the field of fast breeder reactors in the overall interest of development and improving the quality of life of the citizenry Atomic Energy Commission Chairman R. Chidambaram asserted here on Monday.

Inaugurating a four-week residential course on "An integrated approach to knowledge, and information" at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Chidambaram pointed out that there were many dimensions to nuclear energy, the generation of electricity being only one facet of the country's nuclear programme.

Over the years the spin-off from nuclear research had enriched industry, helped medical sciences and boosted agriculture. BARC [Bhabha Atomic Research Center] for example had played a vital role in the agriculture sector by creating new pulse varieties. In Maharashtra farmers who cultivated BARC-developed pulse varieties 31,000 hectares in 1989 had been so impressed with the yield that they increased their sowing area to 2,00,000 hectares by 1993.

He said nuclear energy would be increasingly used in the country in the 21st century as conservationists were up in arms against mega hydel projects and the heavily polluting thermal projects.

Chidambaram pointed out that efforts were on to make use of India's vast reserves of thorium which were five times more than the uranium reserves. "Our pressurised heavy water reactors use uranium, hence work is on to make greater use of thorium. At Kakrapa, in Gujarat we have made a beginning. But much more needs to be done," he said.

Chidambaram said that India's safety record in the running of its nuclear power plants had been very good. "The truth is that the dangers of radiation are more pronounced at radiology departments and at X-ray units where proper precautions are not taken. The Atomic Energy Regulatory Board was studying ways and means to reduce the danger posed to patients," he said.

Later, participating in the Foundation Day celebration of the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) he called upon the scientists to make use of the synergistic strengths of various research organisations across the country to contribute to the growth and development of the nation.

IRAN

Official on Expansion of Petrochemical Complex*NC2301093394 Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran
First Program Network in Persian 0430 GMT 23 Jan 94*

[Text] The products of the Arak petrochemical complex—which has an annual production capacity of 350,000 tons—have eliminated the needs of most of the country's industrial units for raw materials.

The deputy minister for petrochemical affairs in the Petroleum Ministry, who is also the director general of the National Petrochemical Company (NPC), announced yesterday: The units of the Arak Petrochemical Complex have begun full production. In an exclusive interview with the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he provided more details:

[Begin recording] Unidentified correspondent: Can you give us details regarding the latest petrochemical units that have recently become operational at the Arak Petrochemical Complex?

Deputy minister: I can give the glad tidings to our dear compatriots that the Islamic country of Iran is now the primary producer of raw materials for the plastics industry in Arak. We now produce various plastic substances while formerly this industry was dependent on foreign imports. Fortunately, today we produce 350,000 tons of such materials in Arak, which fulfills most of the needs of our 1,500-2,000 indigenous factories engaged in the plastics industry.

In the near future we will eliminate all the remaining shortages with the production at the Bandar-e Imam Petrochemical Complex. These products entered the market about two months ago. Today, fortunately, the first phase of the Arak Petrochemical Complex, which includes six industrial units, has become completely operational and will cater to the needs of numerous domestic factories. It may be worth mentioning here that plastic materials are byproducts of petrochemicals, which have extensive value-added uses and consumption in the areas of foodstuffs, clothing, housing, hygiene, and health. You will see the large variety of such products in these fields as they replace natural materials such as minerals, iron ore, other metals, and cotton.

I personally wish to stress that since we have been successful in producing these goods from crude oil, the entire country should endeavor to boost its use of these products in the country and to reduce their use of natural products, especially since synthetics are cheaper to use and produce. We intend to replace natural products with plastics.

The production of petrochemicals in Arak marks a quantum leap and a change of the climate in the petrochemicals industry in Iran, praise be to God. In the near future we will be quite (self-sufficient) in this area.

Correspondent: Thank you.

Deputy minister: You are welcome. *[end recording]*

PAKISTAN

Bhutto Reiterates 'Peaceful Nuclear Policy'

*BK1501153594 Islamabad PTV Television Network
in English 1500 GMT 15 Jan 94*

[Text] The prime minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, has said Pakistan firmly believes in going ahead with making a fuller peaceful use of atomic technology. She was presiding over the annual meeting of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Council in Islamabad today. The council reviewed the progress of work at different establishments of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and considered the main

lines of future programs of the commission which lay emphasis on self-reliance and indigenization.

Addressing the council, the prime minister said the Islamic, democratic and awami [people's] government fully supports achieving excellence and advancement of technology, be it simple or high technology. It was the elected prime minister, late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had first started the atomic projects in Pakistan which are now being implemented. Late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had 25 years ago given an autonomous status to Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and sought cooperation of the United States for support of PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] and other atomic projects. Now, the prime minister said, with Chinese cooperation her government is completing the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant after 25 years. There are some undue misgivings about our peaceful nuclear program, but we hope that Pakistan would very soon be able to allay these misgivings.

The prime minister expressed the determination to make Pakistan an enviable, progressive and developed state. She paid tributes to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission scientists for working selflessly and single-mindedly without looking for award or name. The present government, after its takeover, especially marked one of its cabinet meetings for preparation and approval of the new technology policy. Despite financial constraints, the government earmarked an amount of 1 billion rupees for this purpose. She expressed the confidence that the new policy would lead the country toward rapid economic development. The present government is attaching high priority to the energy sector. Work at the 300-megawatt nuclear power plant acquired during 1988-90 would be completed soon. The prime minister complimented the commission on its performance and directed it to work with greater vigor for peaceful application of nuclear technology for socioeconomic uplift in the country.

Earlier, the prime minister was shown the indigenously redesigned and upgraded Pakistan Research Reactor-I and the research facilities around it. The chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Ashfaq Ahmed, briefed the prime minister about the activities in pursuit of peaceful application of atomic energy.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Kozyrev on Compensation To Ukraine For Nuclear Disarmament*LD1401223494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2144 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Moscow Jan 14 TASS—The documents on the complete destruction of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal by its transfer to and scrapping in Russia, which were signed in the Kremlin, also determine the procedure of the payment of compensation to Kiev for their loss, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said in an interview with ITAR-TASS.

This loss, according to Kozyrev, will be made up with uranium fuel, which Russia will obtain after recycling the weapon-grade uranium in collaboration with the United States. Part of the profit gained from the sale of uranium on the world market belongs to Ukraine, Kozyrev noted. The uranium after all is the property of the former Soviet Union, which is why the profit from its sale will be divided, he said. "We ourselves will obtain weapon-grade uranium, recycle it and sell to America, and the share belonging to Ukraine will be paid in the form of uranium fuel," he clarified.

According to the Russian foreign minister, there is no provision for any additional payments by Russia, and also of writing off a part of Ukraine's debts.

Andrei Kozyrev said that the United States will provide additional resources so that Moscow and Kiev can both ensure safety during the dismantling of the nuclear arsenal, its transportation and other necessary procedures. Naturally, the dismantling of the arsenal—the nuclear contents and the warhead—will be carried out in Russia only. Not because, Kozyrev emphasised, Moscow wants to humiliate or offend Ukraine, but because the appropriate plants are located in Russia and a warhead can only be dismantled where it was made, otherwise there would be a real danger of monstrous environmental consequences.

The signed agreements really are historical. A political decision has been made and the political will has been displayed, now only "purely technical work" is needed to go ahead, Kozyrev said. First of all we should determine the share belonging to Ukraine, deduct from it Russia's expenses on recycling it and other works and repay this part "in whatever form the Ukrainians want and the Russians can manage," he said. But it is a purely technical question, the Russian minister said.

Speaking of security guarantees given to Ukraine, Andrei Kozyrev emphasised that they are basically standard ones. These are the same guarantees which the three countries, the United States, England and Russia, give to all the participants in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons treaty. It is quite natural that the signed documents will

come into force only after Ukraine joins the nuclear weapon nonproliferation treaty as a nonnuclear state, the Russian minister said.

Russian General Warns of Improper Nuclear Storage in Ukraine*OW2501055694 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 0640 GMT 20 Jan 94*

[VoyenTV "Bearing South" video report; from the "Military Review" program]

[Text] Now a few words about one of the most important military-political events of the week. Russia and Ukraine, not without some help from the U.S. President, have finally managed to agree on the future of Ukraine's nuclear potential.

At the meeting of three presidents—the Presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine—Leonid Kravchuk confirmed Ukraine would join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as soon as possible as a state without nuclear weapons. *[video carries montage of shots showing troops handling weapons components; the "Voyen TV," Ministry of Defense Television Studio logo is shown at top right of screen]* It is presumed the first 200 nuclear weapons will be withdrawn from Ukraine to Russia within 10 months. Altogether about 2,000 nuclear weapons must be dismantled in Ukraine. *[video cuts to show Colonel General V.P. Maslin, chief of a Main Directorate of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, addressing a news conference]*

[Begin Maslin recording] In their statement the Presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the security and reliability of nuclear weapons until they are dismantled. At the same time, the state of affairs regarding nuclear safety on the territory of Ukraine continues to worsen. Storage depots are packed beyond standard limits with warheads and nuclear munitions that have been removed from service.

This is intolerable and besides everything else, it has brought about a considerable increase in radiation levels. This has been confirmed by chief designers from Arzamas-16 who visited Pervomaysk on Ukrainian territory in September last year. The warranty periods of most component parts have expired. *[end recording; video shows destruction of a launch tube]*

The signed agreement promises that nuclear weapons, which are dangerous not only when used but also when improperly stored, will stop being used as bargaining chips in political games.

Russian, Ukrainian Officials on Nuclear Weapons*LD1401220594*

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1725 GMT on 14 January carries the regularly scheduled "Details" program. The program, hosted by Nikolay Svanidze, contains excerpts of interviews with

Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, and Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, by unidentified correspondents. Places and dates of the interviews are not given.

The program opens with an excerpt from Kravchuk who says that 14 January is New Year's Day according to the "old calendar." Therefore, he wishes the people of Russia and everybody a Happy New Year. Kravchuk says, "And on the whole, this month, is, let's say, a new beginning because today is the beginning of a new account. Because today's document is the beginning of a new page for Ukraine, for Russia and for the whole world."

Svanidze then says that in Moscow today the presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine discussed nuclear weapons and Ukraine agreed to withdraw to Russia 176 intercontinental missiles and approximately 1,500 warheads for dismantling.

Next follows an excerpt of Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy's interview. He says: "Ukraine is not backing down. I would call it a trilateral compromise. All three sides made some compromises. I would not say that the biggest compromise was made by Ukraine."

In a further excerpt of the Kravchuk interview, Kravchuk says: "To embark upon the path of confrontation or ambition is a bad thing. Most in Ukraine understand this, I know. Unfortunately, there are people who see things differently. Fortunately, such people are in the minority."

Then Kryzhanovskiy says in his interview, "The president, in this case, is carrying out, in full and in principle, the will of the people. Moreover, there are even certain, I would say, contradictions between him and the parliament, which wants these weapons to remain on the territory of Ukraine for a certain time, until certain conditions prevail."

Svanidze says that Kravchuk is in a difficult situation. He has been performing a balancing act for the past two years—balancing the temptation to be leader of a nuclear state and the impossibility of keeping these "expensive toys."

Kryzhanovskiy is then shown saying, "We are not thinking of servicing of these nuclear weapons. We were counting on them being serviced by Russian specialists alone."

Next is an excerpt from Kravchuk, who says, "The nuclear weapons which we inherited from the former Soviet Union could not be used by Ukraine, speaking frankly, as a guarantor of security or as weapons of deterrence, because they were manufactured in Russia, the codes—in Russia, the buttons—in Russia. Therefore, that is all an illusion."

An excerpt from the Kozyrev interview follows. He says, "Against whom were the nuclear missiles in Ukraine, which were installed by the former Soviet Union, directed? Against the USA and NATO, and they are aimed at the

USA and NATO. They are not aimed at Russia. And the missiles which are in America? They used to be aimed at the Soviet Union—and now in Moscow... [pauses] and incidentally, that bilateral, Russian-American agreement is much more important for us. Why? Because American weapons used to and are still to this day aimed at Moscow. Nuclear weapons, each of which is capable of wiping out in a second what we have here."

"Well, the agreement reached on not targeting them, the flight assignment is to be canceled, and that process will be finished in about two month's time. That is what the Presidents of Russia and the United States agreed in Moscow. That is to say, you and I are no longer rabbits. At least, in two month's time we will not be in a situation where any madman may at any moment press that infamous button by accident and a missile will fly according to an assignment set years ago - namely towards us. It will fly, but most likely, into space. Do you understand [word indistinct]. That is a substantial thing. The Ukrainian missiles—that is, those in Ukraine, are not aimed at us. Therefore, it may be important for the Americans—the missiles are aimed at them."

Svanidze, shown sitting on a sofa beside Kozyrev, asks if the missiles can be pointed a new target. Kozyrev replies: "But it is not that easy to retarget them, and Moscow is the one who has to retarget them because that infamous button for these missiles is in Moscow. But naturally, we will not do that. We will not point these missiles at ourselves."

Svanidze says that pressure has been brought to bear on Kravchuk from domestic and foreign forces. He was beset by crisis in 1993 and anti-Russian feeling is running high in Ukraine, but compensation is promised Ukraine for giving up its nuclear weapons.

Kravchuk is shown saying, "Taking account of the fact that there will be compensation for the tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, that there will be guarantees of national security, financial, economic, technical and guaranteed aid. All of that is in Ukraine's interest."

Svanidze then says that Ukraine has not managed to step out of Russia's shadow and embark upon independent dialogue with the West, but Kravchuk did what he had to do as president of a country beset by economic problems such as Ukraine's.

Kravchuk is again shown. He says, "It is not that one will be the older and the other the younger, that one is the older brother and one the younger brother, that one is the leader and the other is subordinate. The peoples will be equal. Equal in all their relations, one a bit more, one a bit less."

A further fragment of Kozyrev's interview follows: "The episode with Ukraine is the clearing away of Russia's old obstructions. Do you see? Essentially, the meeting on the Ukrainian theme, unfortunately, took place two years later than it should have done and this is the reason for the delay in the process of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine."

Kazakhstan Wants Ukraine-Type Deal for Dismantling Missiles*PM2101201994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 94 p 4*

[Article by Boris Vinogradov: "Almaty Demands Billion Dollars for Its Uranium"]

[Text] Kazakhstan intends to be get the full amount [poluchit spolna] for the uranium contained in the warheads of the 104 SS-18 missiles located on its territory.

Nursultan Nazarbayev said this in Kiev, where he is on an official visit. The Kazakh president pointed out that he is ready to sign a new agreement with Russia either on a bilateral basis or on a quadrilateral basis involving Ukraine and Belarus. In the next few days he will be going to Washington to discuss these problems with Bill Clinton.

Russia believed that the matter of compensation for the nuclear material in the strategic missiles due for removal from Kazakhstan was in principle closed. There are agreements on this point. Almaty, like Kiev and Minsk, should receive its share after deduction of expenditure on the reprocessing of highly enriched uranium and its transportation and storage at Russian plants.

However, all the indications are that the method of calculation adopted earlier does not suit the Kazakh side. It intends to follow the example of Ukraine, which succeeded a week ago in obtaining \$1 billion on signing the trilateral agreement with Russia and the United States in Moscow. This money is being given to Ukraine out of the sum appropriated by the U.S. Congress for the nuclear disarmament of the CIS countries under the START I treaty. It has become known that Almaty is hoping for similar compensation.

In other words, Kazakhstan, like Ukraine, has decided not to wait for funds to come into its account from the sale of uranium by its Russian partners, whom it is not inclined to trust very much. It is obviously safer to get insurance now, in the form of a guaranteed billion out of the U.S. quota.

Experts believe that in that event Russia will have to take on additional expenditure for the safe dismantling of nuclear warheads in the possession of its CIS neighbors. It cannot be rule out that Belarus will demand its share in the same way, although some of the uranium has already been shipped out of its territory to Russia for reprocessing. When it hosted Bill Clinton recently, Minsk received \$100 million from this same package. But now, REUTER reports, Belarus is laying claim to a further \$500 million.

RUSSIA**Safety of Planned Underground Nuclear Plant Questioned***WS2401204594 Kaliningrad KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 94 p 3*

[Article by M. Oysboy, chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast branch of the Chernobyl Union: "Submarine That

Cannot Sail..."—first paragraph is KALININGRADSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Discussion around the possibility and expediency of building an underground nuclear power plant in our oblast—judging by the number of letters from our readers—still draws attention. We have published articles by Mr. Dolgov, a representative of the joint stock company Malakhit, and Mr. Leonov, commander of the APLK-27 submarine boat, who have called on citizens of our region to mature to the understanding that building a nuclear power plant in our oblast is necessary. In response to these appeals, ordinary citizens of Kaliningrad Oblast have sent us letters objecting to this idea. M. Oysboy, chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast branch of the Chernobyl Union, has also joined the discussion. His position and justified criticisms have made us rethink other aspects of this issue.

The idea of constructing a nuclear power plant in our oblast was first suggested by Dolgov, a representative of the joint stock company Malakhit, which was once working on designs for nuclear reactor steam-generating machines for the defense industry. The approaching conversion has made the designers seek a nice wrapping for the introduction of their products on "peaceful" markets. In other words, the "atomic lobby" has tried to pour new blood into an old industry which was damaged along with the Chernobyl reactor. In other countries, the lobby's synonym is the "nuclear Mafia." I dare say that it is the most dangerous one. There have been many cases when top-level officials from different oblast administrations, or even the government, who were previously sharply opposed to this lobby, have suddenly changed their opinions completely. It is quite obvious with what this has been connected.

The apparently absolute nuclear security and safe operation of the proposed type of reactors with liquid metal heaters serve as arguments for building an underground nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad Oblast, and the underground location of the plant is portrayed as additional security. At least three aspects here are alarming. The first two have already been presented—the failure of a similar reactor on the APLK-27, the causes of which are still unknown, and the well-known vacuum reactivity effect, another inherent fault of this type of reactor.

There is also a more recent example: Russian VESTI has reported that a leak of radioactive sodium occurred during a recent accident at the Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant. Apparently, the accident involved the recommended type of reactor with a liquid metal heater. Sodium is used in no other type of reactor. The secure operation of underground nuclear power plants also raises doubts. Such a plant will rather resemble a nuclear submarine that cannot come to the surface. Every component of this system may provoke an emergency situation. The number of emergency situations at currently operating nuclear power plants and submarines is listed in the three-digit range. I will cite a sample from a report by the Government Commission for Investigating Causes of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Breakdown.

"There has been no single year without an emergency situation at the nuclear power plant... There have been 1,042 emergency stoppages of power units over the last five years; among them, only 35 percent have occurred due to human error."

This means that the remaining 65 percent were caused by technical malfunctions and led to serious consequences. The most frequent emergency situation on nuclear submarines is fire. An analysis of the causes of fires on Soviet and U.S. Navy nuclear submarines shows that 70 percent of such accidents have been caused by short circuits in electric switchboards and wires, which are connected with technical defects. There are twice as many electric wires in a nuclear power plant as on a submarine. Whereas a nuclear submarine can surface and call for help from other naval vessel, an underground nuclear power plant will not sail, and therefore, politely speaking, it is very hard to extinguish a fire in one.

There is an array of intermediate scenarios between these two extremes, but it is obvious that a number of problems will have to be solved over the coming decades or even centuries, depending on the half-lives or degeneration of nuclear components. There are also two intriguing economic aspects of building a nuclear power plant. The first one is that the Malakhit joint stock company will charge only for designing a nuclear power plant, which will take three or five years. Who will build it, provide necessary supplies, and complete the work? All Malakhit needs right now is money, and later it will somehow be built. The second aspect is that those who have suffered from nuclear arms research have been asking who is responsible for that after these many years. Who is to pay compensation for possible accidents?

My position is clear: We do not need such problems. However, neither the current administration nor future parliament will have the right to resolve this problem. I am deeply convinced that only the entire population of our oblast, having complete information about the risks facing them as well as possible profits and losses, can decide whether they want to live in such a neighborhood. This can be done only by way of a region-wide referendum.

Kozyrev Advocates 'Partnership' With NATO

AU1201135594 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
10 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

["Article Received Through RIA-Novosti Exclusively for ADEVARUL" by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev: "Russia and NATO"]

[Text] The tendency to establish a democratic Europe as a whole is being thwarted by the tendency to break it up and the appearance of new threats and dangers. Which of these tendencies is going to prevail? This greatly depends on the decisions that will be adopted in Brussels and by the CSCE in Budapest.

Toward what goals should the general security system that is going to be established be directed? What criteria are to

be used to establish this system? What possible ways are there for this system to come about?

One cannot say that there is a crisis of solutions—apparently with "only one way" that is effective—to European security issues. These solutions are based on two myths that are believed by their supporters as being axioms of current European policy. First, we talk about the thesis that there is a "security vacuum" and a "gray zone" in Central Europe, which is condemned inevitably to become Russia's sphere of expansion. And second, we talk about the thesis of "Russia's move toward a nationalistic, imperialist policy" after the recent parliamentary elections.

By putting the two affirmations together, one can conclude that NATO must defend Central European countries from the imminent pressure coming from the East.

To accept the thesis of the "security vacuum" would mean to reject precisely the essence of the general European process, the way in which it is described in the Paris Charter, namely the unity of democratic peoples in Europe. This would be the greatest failure of the orientation of the entire European policy, which, apparently, in spite of unavoidable difficulties, brought about the unification of Germany and ensured the destruction of the totalitarian monsters of the 20th century.

And if we consider the worst-case scenario—the revival of Russian imperialism—then we should start, not from the hypothesis of "Soviet tanks" pouring into the West, but from a replay of the Yugoslav drama in the former USSR. The result would be tens of millions of refugees, catastrophe in great industrial complexes, and the danger posed by the use of tactical nuclear weapons. What will NATO be able to do in such a situation to defend its Eastern members? Two Chernobyls would be more than enough for all of Europe. The "guard on the [River] Bug" would not be able to save anybody.

Among other things, this scenario—the worst possible—might be provoked precisely by a hasty expansion of NATO. It would serve the extremists in Russia as the most convincing argument in favor of a revival of the Russian empire to reject the "pressure of the West." Thus, the strategy of "the most evil scenario" is dangerous because it carries in itself a forecast that can very easily become reality.

The fear of a new "Russian threat" can be eliminated first of all through a partnership with democratic Russia, which has embarked on a path of establishing a rule-of-law state and a market economy. The foreign policy promoted by Russia's president has already proved its orientation toward achieving the national interest of the country through partnership and not through confrontation with the surrounding world. This foreign policy is sanctioned in a democratic Constitution. Russia does not have territorial claims on any country in the world, and thus no claims on Central or Eastern European countries either. Russia's new military doctrine directs its armed forces exclusively

toward defending the country and its allies and toward peace operations in accordance with Russia's international engagements.

As far as the results of the parliamentary elections are concerned, I am convinced that there can be no fertile ground for any real fascist outbursts in Russia, a country that in World War II took more sacrifices than any other country in the world to the shrine of the victory over fascism. The electorate cast their votes not for a "campaign against the West" or "to set out for the South Seas" and not for the forced restoration of the Soviet Union or of the socialist camp. They voted against the ambitions and arrogance of certain reformers, against their lack of ability to explain to the people the goal of reform in simple, human language, and against the current lack of social protection for the population and the inadequacy of the fight against crime. The Russian democrats have already started to draw the necessary conclusions from the awakening lessons administered to them by the parliamentary elections. But there is not and will never be any "flirtation" with right-wing extremism. We condemn all overt or covert forms of extremism, aggressive nationalism, and fascism.

The West in turn must also draw conclusions and correct the tone and the manner of its dialogue with Russia. Advice and recommendations have no room in this dialogue. The partner starts off on the wrong foot by presenting certain proposals that we must either adopt entirely or reject entirely, without the right to make certain adjustments to it, in accordance with our own interests.

Now is the time when Russia should feel more strongly foreign support for its reform process. An accurately worked out, detailed strategy of cooperation between Russia and its democratic allies in the West is required now. We need new strategic schemes and mechanisms to implement them that would thoroughly reflect the current degree of maturity in our relations. And most important: One should proceed from promises of large scale cooperation made to Russia in Tokyo to the fulfillment of those promises.

In the process of establishing a new architecture of Europe it is important to take into account a number of criteria, such as:

- a balanced approach, in subsequent stages to the European security system. The methods of "shock diplomacy" and the policy of the "fait accompli" should be excluded. The Russian side is in favor of broad consultations with all the interested states.
- the open nature of regional organizations and institutions as a guarantee of their appropriate adaptation to the current European realities. Russia has no right to dictate who should and who should not join NATO, but we have the right to count on the fact that the North Atlantic Alliance will take into account the particularities of the transition period, which is inevitably a long-term process. And if we were to talk about a longer

term process, it should confirm the position included in the documents through which NATO declares itself open to accept all democratic states in the Euro-Atlantic region. One should not exclude a priori that in the future Russia will also request to be accepted into NATO. It is important to ensure an effective partnership, based on equal rights in the period of transition and of mutual adaptation.

- ensuring an equal level of security for each European state. The emergence of "first degree security and second degree security," of "gray zones," of "special spheres of influence," of "isolated regions," or of "cordons sanitaires" in Europe are inadmissible.
- the preservation of a contract-juridical base for European security.
- the elimination of territorial claims in interstate relations in Europe.

The major goals of the strategy of partnership that we are proposing in the political sphere and in the area of security must be the following:

- First: to develop Euro-Atlantic cooperation. The CSCE should be turned into a political organization for all the regions (a general regional organization), and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council into an organization of independent political and military cooperation, but closely connected with the CSCE. Their goal should be to coordinate the efforts of NATO, the Western European Union, and the CIS on international security, achieving peace, and ensuring the active defense of the European ethnic minorities' rights to their language and other rights. I believe that a great step in this respect would be to adopt at the Rome session of the CSCE a declaration on fighting aggressive nationalism.
- Second: to create a system of mutual guarantees for the security of Central and Eastern European countries. The stronger interstate relations are, the more durable the nature of their relations will be.
- Third: I welcome the proposal of my German colleague Kinkel to conclude certain conventions of cooperation and consultation between NATO on the one hand and Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and Ukraine on the other. The opening of a NATO-CIS communications channel would also be useful.
- Fourth: to increase the capacity of European countries to ensure peace. For the time being, we should say it openly, East and West have not found a common way to respond to local conflicts in Yugoslavia or the former USSR, although meanwhile these conflicts have become a great problem for European security.
- Fifth: to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. It is not correct to present the Russian-Ukrainian dispute around the issue of strategic missiles as an episode in the process of dividing the Soviet

inheritance. Here we are talking about ways to prevent the creation of a breach in the regime of nuclear non-proliferation. The strategy of European partnership should foresee strong encouragement for the strict observance of the accord on nonproliferation of nuclear weapon.

Certainly, separate discussions are required by the economic component of the partnership and the essence of those discussions would be to move from the stage of certain chronically delayed programs to moves to include Russia in the international division of labor on an equal basis and without discrimination, and to facilitate its access to European markets.

The dialogue on the issue of partnership for Europe is already actively developing. I hope that the NATO summit, through its balanced and farsighted decisions, will mark a useful contribution to the development of this dialogue. The members of the North Atlantic Alliance can find in Russia an interesting and responsible partner for drafting this strategy.

Official Denies Threat of Weapons-Grade Plutonium

LD2401104094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1024 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov sent a letter to Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, requesting to take adequate measures to prevent Interior Ministry staff members from making reports on the situation at the Atomic Energy Ministry, "which are based on fabrications and fantasies without appropriate scientific examination and documented confirmation."

The letter was prompted by the fact that Interior Ministry officials made statements for some mass media, alleging that thefts of arms uranium, plutonium and even nuclear warheads from facilities of the military-industrial complex and the Atomic Energy ministry have become an ordinary thing.

Mikhaylov claimed that there are no facts corroborating thefts of arms plutonium and nuclear warheads from the ministry's facilities. If the Interior Ministry has such facts, they should be documented.

Preparations in Progress for Destroying CW Stocks

Forty Thousand Tons Must Go

PM1401124794 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1100 GMT 13 Jan 94

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by V. Tarasov and A. Bozhzhov, identified by caption; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [110625] [Tarasov over video of dummy wearing gas mask] Exactly a year ago representatives of more than 100 of the world's countries signed a multilateral convention in Paris banning chemical weapons.

The manufacture of chemical weapons ended in the former USSR back in 1987. Nonetheless, Russia has inherited 40,000 tons of lethal fluids and gases. These are the biggest stockpiles in the world. The convention stipulates that by the beginning of the next century virtually no chemical weapons stockpiles will remain. Currently preparations for the destruction of these weapons are under way. The coordination of the efforts of ministries and departments has been entrusted to the Committee for Convention Problems.

[A. Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee for Convention Problems Under the Russian President, identified by caption] The expenditure involved runs into trillions. We expect that in the course of the talks between Boris Nikolayevich and Bill Clinton important accords will be reached on problems of U.S. participation in specific areas of our program for the destruction of chemical weapons. [110727] [video shows dummy with gas mask, computer equipment, man in gas mask, large tanks with electronic counter and button marked "feed," a map entitled "Chemical weapon storage and production facilities," interview]

Problems Pondered

PM1701125394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

["Expert Analysis" article by Igor Vlasov, head of sector of the Russian Federation President's Committee on Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention: "Chemical 'Thorns' in the Country's Side"—passage within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] The problem of the destruction of chemical weapons has alarmed the country's public. The sociopolitical situation has been sharply aggravated in the regions where it is planned to site installations for the destruction of the chemical weapons arsenal, and certain representatives of social movements are trying to exploit the currently fashionable topic of chemical disarmament in their own interests. Journalists are citing unverified facts, and people weighed down with science degrees are now trying to draw attention to themselves by making revelatory statements. The press increasingly often carries articles in which so-called chemical weapons experts who like to pose as major specialists try to intimidate the public with reports on the alleged continuation of scientific research into chemical weapons, their unauthorized destruction, secret burials on land and in water, and so forth.

In our view, such activity by "experts" and "selfless campaigners" is pursuing an unseemly aim: Using unverified and sometimes knowingly false statistics, they juggle this information around and impose on the public a distorted and unobjective view of the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons.

That is why I consider it expedient to examine consistently the basic stages in the implementation of the 1993 Convention on the Banning of Chemical Weapons.

First of all, I would recall that the state, which signed the Convention, is beginning work on the destruction of chemical weapons within a maximum of two years and will complete it no more than 10 years after the convention's entry into force. In the first stage, that is no more than two years after the ratification of the Convention, tests of the first facility for the destruction of chemical weapons will be carried out and then, no more than three years later, at least one percent of the stocks of these weapons is to be destroyed. In Russia's case this will mean 400 tonnes of toxic agents. In the subsequent stages, which are to be carried out no later than five, seven, and 10 years after the convention's entry into force, at least 20-45 percent of the weapons are to be destroyed, as are eventually all the remaining stocks of chemical weapons. Each state will choose its own method of destruction independently. It should be noted that the destruction process is to correspond to the very latest scientific achievements and be carried out at specially equipped sites. Meanwhile the destruction of toxic agents by burial on land, underwater, or by incineration in the open air is not permitted.

According to specialists' estimates, as far as Russia is concerned the Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons could come into force in 1995 and the operation of the first facility for the destruction of toxic agents could begin in 1997. Russian President B. N. Yeltsin made a statement in spring last year in which he said among other things: "The world has changed, Russia's position in the world has changed, and we do not intend to attack anyone. The time has come to get rid of chemical weapons—they are the past which we have inherited." Let us note that the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons is of great sociopolitical and social significance for Russia, due first and foremost to the need to lower the level of ecological tension in regions where the arsenals of these weapons are based. The program for the destruction of chemical weapons that the state is elaborating gives priority to the unconditional guarantee of safeguarding the life and health of the population as well as measures to protect the environment.

Social protection is also envisaged for the population living in zones where enterprises for the destruction of chemical weapons are to be sited: The latest technologies will be used and the volumes of toxic substances to be shipped across Russia's territory will be kept to a minimum. All this will involve considerable material expenditure especially since there is no special-purpose industrial facility for the destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation.

The Committee on Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention has been created to coordinate the verification of the fulfillment of international commitments in the sphere of the destruction of chemical and biological weapons. The policy of chemical disarmament

in Russia has long needed an agency which would be independent of such powerful structures as the Defense Ministry and enterprises in the military-industrial complex, could carry out the process of disarmament in our country in a highly skilled and objective way, and could worthily represent Russia's interests in the international arena. Academician A. Kuntsevich, the well known scientist, was appointed chairman of this committee. In the past a military chemist, he made a major contribution to the creation of decontamination procedures which render toxic substances harmless and he set up a scientific school.

...Today all Russia's chemical weapons stocks are housed in special-purpose arsenals of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry—these are the seven chemical "thorns" in Russia's side: the city of Kambarka and the settlement of Kizner (Udmurtia), the settlement of Gornyy (Saratov Oblast), the city of Shchuchye (Kurgan Oblast), the city of Pochep (Bryansk Oblast), the settlement of Leonilovka (Penza Oblast), and the settlement of Maradykovskiy (Kirov Oblast). The total quantity of chemical weapons is 40,000 tonnes, made up as follows: organophosphorous toxic agents (sarin, zamin [as transliterated], and VX)—32,300 tonnes; mustard gas, lewisite, and their compounds—7,700 tonnes; and phosgene—5,000 tonnes. If the Paris convention is ratified, the process of the destruction of these weapons should begin in 1997.

To enable the Russian Federation to fulfill its international commitments, the Committee on Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention under the Russian Federation President, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation Ministry of Ecology, the Russian Federation Ministry of Health, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and other ministries, elaborated in 1992 the draft first stage of the comprehensive program for the destruction of chemical weapons. Leaders of local administrations and representatives of public organizations in those regions where it is planned to site facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons took part in the discussion of this program. The draft was adopted after comments, amendments, and clarifications.

An essential condition of work on the draft is the public discussion of proposed decisions, a state ecological feasibility study of them, and the elaboration of the corresponding legislative acts. It is also recommended that a federal targeted program be elaborated to eliminate the consequences of the production of chemical weapons on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The chemical "thorns" can be removed from Russia's side only if there is a skilled, comprehensive, and well-balanced approach to the problem of the destruction of chemical weapons and joint efforts by scientific specialists, state and public organizations, and the local administration and population of the regions where the installations for the destruction of chemical weapons, one of the most treacherous types of weapon of mass destruction, are to be sited.

Moscow Reportedly To Continue Observing Testing Moratorium

PM1301114194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Jan 94 p 4

[Unattributed reply to reader's letter under the "Briefing for the Readers" rubric: "The 1,641th Underground Hiroshima"]

[Text] Will China's recent underground nuclear explosion not encourage Russia and the United States to carry out new nuclear tests?

[Signed] S. Boychenko, Lipetsk

The underground test in the PRC of a nuclear explosive device with a yield of 80-90 kilotonnes carried out 5 October last year has indeed complicated the situation. So far the leading nuclear powers have abided by their voluntary unilateral commitments to refrain from such actions ideally until the signing in 1996 of an agreement on a complete ban on underground nuclear explosions. Tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water were banned earlier by the international treaty of 1963.

However, the members of the "nuclear club" decided not to follow China's example and will continue to observe the moratorium on underground explosions although both Russia and the United States proclaimed a little over four months ago their readiness not to hold such tests only so long as the other great powers refrained from them. So far only the leadership of France has expressed the theoretical possibility of staging a series of tests in the period up to 1996.

As of now the nuclear powers have officially given notice of 2,166 nuclear test explosions (954 by the United States, 936 by the USSR, 192 by France, 44 by Britain, 39 by China, and one by India). Of that number the 1,641th nuclear device has now been detonated underground at the test sites shown on the attached map. [Note: A map accompanies the article showing test sites at Nevada, Mururoa, Novaya Zemlya, Semipalatinsk, Lopnor, and the Tar desert]

As far as is known, neither Russia nor Britain intends to detonate even those test charges that they have stored in underground galleries: In Russia's case at the test site in Semipalatinsk, in Britain's at the U.S. site in Nevada. So let us hope that 1994 becomes nuclear-free at least on the territory of the main nuclear countries.

Moscow Arms Control Chief on Nuclear Industry Issues

AU1401194894 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German
13 Jan 94 p 23

[Interview with the head of the Moscow Center for Arms Control, Anatoliy Dyakov, by Andrzej Rybak; place and date not given: "Still Under Control"]

[Text]

Rybak: Russia stores some 180 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, which is enough to produce 90,000 nuclear warheads. But the Russians go on producing plutonium. Why?

Dyakov: This situation is far from logical to me also. Three reactors—two in Tomsk, one in Krasnoyarsk—are still producing weapons-grade plutonium. But they also generate electricity. If they were closed down, many people would be without electricity and heating. Yet, the government says there is another reason as well: The fuel used in the reactors cannot be stored for a long period. It has to be processed if even greater risks to humans and the environment are to be avoided.

Rybak: Russia is in the midst of an economic crisis. Does this have an effect on the destruction of nuclear weapons, as laid down in the START Treaties?

Dyakov: This is, indeed, a major financial problem. A total of 30,000 nuclear warheads are to be destroyed. Storing one gram of plutonium costs between \$1 and \$2 per year. The warheads contain a total of 60 tonnes of plutonium. This means that storing them alone would cost \$60 to \$120 million a year. The entire nuclear complex consumes some \$1.5 billion per year. Using about 20 percent of capacity for disarmament would cost some \$300 million per year. And the work will take 10 to 15 years.

Rybak: The United States promised Russia financial support for disarmament.

Dyakov: There is a \$800 million fund. But this has been almost completely exhausted.

Rybak: The rich threshold countries are very much interested in Russian nuclear scientists. How big is the danger that they might sell their knowledge?

Dyakov: I, personally, do not know of any scientist of the "inner circle" who has emigrated to these countries.

Rybak: But an increasing number of them lose their jobs. Scientists at the secret nuclear complex Arzamas-16 were on strike recently because their salaries had not been paid.

Dyakov: The scientists' situation is very bleak. But I do not think this will lead to mass migration.

Rybak: In Germany and Poland there have been several cases of smugglers being arrested with nuclear material.

Dyakov: This was only slightly enriched uranium that is not suitable for weapons. As to the military nuclear complex, the situation is still under control.

Rybak: Corruption is on the increase within the Russian Army. All kinds of weapons are being stolen and sold. Why not nuclear weapons?

Dyakov: Your concern is justified. If everybody steals, including government personnel, you cannot expect the Army to be any better.

Rybak: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty will expire in 1995. What will happen then?

Dyakov: I think that the Treaty will simply be extended. I hope that we will finally achieve a ban on tests.

Rybak: In spite of the Nonproliferation Treaty, Iraq and North Korea have almost finished developing the bomb. How can such things be prevented in the future?

Dyakov: We have to put heavy pressure on such countries, impose economic sanctions. But we must also stop discriminating against the threshold countries. We cannot modernize our arsenals and prohibit them from developing the bomb. The First World must set an example by completely destroying its nuclear weapons.

Scientist Explains New 'Hybrid' Nuclear Reactor

LD1801092794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0839 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Marina Barinova]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—The Russian atomic power industry will apparently soon get a safe reactor for nuclear power plants. Its new version was suggested by Russian scientists.

Academician and Nobel prize winner Nikolay Basov, who heads the development project, told ITAR-TASS that "the new reactor is a hybrid model, because it incorporates both nuclear and thermonuclear sub-systems." "Time has forced us to make use of this 'combination'. Russia has accumulated large stockpiles of uranium and plutonium as a result of disarmament and curtailed research in the sphere of nuclear energetics. They can be successfully used in the new reactor," Basov stated.

A laser will play the role of a high-intensity neutron source in the new reactor.

The results of the already staged experiments speak in favour of this type of a hybrid nuclear-thermonuclear reactor.

Dubna Nuclear Research Institute Gains International Status

LD1801212394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1031 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS stringer Yevgeniy Molchanov]

[Text] Dubna, 18 Jan—A new nuclear accelerator operating through superconductivity and a new cyclotron—these two major physics "machines" have been created and are operating at the Combined Nuclear Research Institute [CNRI] at Dubna near Moscow. This was announced today at a session of the CNRI's academic

council, which is summing up last year's results and planning work for the future.

Despite the economic difficulties that science in Russia is experiencing, the CNRI is developing as a major international center in many fields, said Vladimir Kadyshchevskiy, CNRI director and a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He noted that the institute had integrated basic research into the structure of matter, the designing and application of new technologies, and university teaching in the relevant fields of knowledge.

The institute's international courses last year on "Radiation safety: physical, medical, biological and ecological aspects (the lessons of Chernobyl)" helped expand the subject matter of teaching at the CNRI university and the establishment of new contacts. Now documents are being prepared on the organization of a UNESCO-IAEA faculty in Dubna with the same specialization, and it is planned to organize a faculty of economics in cooperation with Moscow University.

Taking part in the work of the Scientific Council are experts from Germany, since a routine agreement has been concluded between the German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology and the CNRI on the use of the institute's installations up to the end of 1996. In this way physicists from one of the leading European states have shown an interest in the development of Dubna Physics Center.

Linking AES's to Accelerators Offers Safety, Cost Benefits

PM1901154394 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1310 GMT 12 Jan 94

[From the "M-Trust" program: Report over video about new power generation concept; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [131118] [Unidentified correspondent over video of exterior, interior of unidentified nuclear power station] As is generally known, despite all the advantages of electricity generation at nuclear power stations, there is also one great disadvantage—the likelihood of the occurrence of an uncontrolled reaction, an explosion, or a meltdown of the active zone of the reactor. We all recall the Chernobyl tragedy and other similar accidents.

Now a new concept has been submitted to the European Organization for Nuclear Research—generation of electricity at a nuclear power station linked with a particle accelerator. The new reactor will be operating in a subcritical mode which rules out the occurrence of a chain reaction. The electricity will be supplied from particle accelerators. According to experts the new power generation technique will be competitive since it does not require new technological development while at the same time providing an ecologically relatively clean, inexhaustible, and reliable source of energy. [131205] [video shows exterior, interior of unidentified nuclear power station, meeting, followed by more installations]

AES Directors Warn of Power Disaster

PM2101161694 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Jan 94 First Edition p3

[Article by Vladimir Gubarev: "Prepare the Candles, Ladies and Gentlemen! The Shutting Down of Nuclear Power Stations Presages a Power Catastrophe"]

[Text] It could happen as early as February. The Russian president and government will find it necessary to introduce a state of emergency. This was stated by directors of nuclear power stations who gathered in Moscow. They warned that, as early as February, the Leningradskaya, Smolenskaya, Kurskaya, Novovoronezhskaya, Kolskaya, and Bilibinskaya power stations will be unable to operate, and hence they will have to shut down their reactors.

Yes, the "greens" who have been "at war" for some years now with the aid of their Western colleagues against Russia's nuclear electric power stations [AES's] can celebrate a "victory." In the situation which has developed our power stations are simply physically incapable of operating, since there is no fuel, it is impossible to carry out systematic repairs, and there is no money to buy spare parts and consumables. And this is at a time when the only sector in Russia which has not decreased production since 1991 and has not permitted a slump [sentence as published]. Moreover, on the results of the work for 1993 our nuclear power stations were superior in virtually all indicators to the AES's of France and the United States. This applies to the reliability of operation, the number of breakdowns, and the performance of the service personnel. These are not "our" statistics, but the conclusions of international experts and organizations.

It should be remembered that in the European part of Russia AES's produce almost one-half of the electricity, and one-fourth of this goes to such centers as Moscow and St. Petersburg. Add to this the fact that "nuclear" electricity is two to three times cheaper than the price which we, the consumers, have to pay. Therefore, the shutdown of AES's will at the very least provoke a two- to threefold increase in tariffs; but we are already used to this.... But something else is more dangerous: Stations are turning from producers into mighty consumers of energy, since this is required in order to maintain safety. And you can't just "hit the switch"—we all know full well what happened at Chernobyl.

And there is no use in hiding it, because of the shutdown of enterprises—including chemical, metallurgical, and machine building enterprises—an electricity surplus has developed in Russia. Electricity is mainly generated by coal and other thermal stations, and consequently, the ecological situation is sharply deteriorating. Discharges into the atmosphere of all manner of substances harmful to man and life in general will increase dramatically. Here is a truly "Pyrrhic victory" for ecology!

Surely we can learn something from the experience of Armenia, where the decommissioning of AES's led to catastrophe? Or from the sad experience of Ukraine, where

the power situation provoked a disastrous slump in industry and agriculture, and therefore, in the life of society as a whole? Do we really prefer to learn from our own mistakes? However, there is not long to wait: If we do not intervene in the fate of Russia's nuclear power stations today, within a month we will find out what a power crisis is really like.... So prepare the candles, ladies and gentlemen!

The directors of Russia's AES's, who gathered at the "Rosenergoatom" concern for their emergency meeting, see as the main culprit of their woes the "supermonopoly structure of the RAO 'YeES Russia' [Russian joint-stock company 'Integrated Energy System of Russia']—the sole consumer of our output." In their appeal to B. Yeltsin and V. Chernomyrdin they laid special stress on this fact.

And it is possible to understand the directors: Any monopoly is harmful. The RAO buys energy from nuclear stations and, as is the custom with us, does not pay for it in full. But the RAO also does not receive money from consumers—it is probably impossible to find one enterprise today which has paid for the electricity it has received. Moreover, even our neighbors in the nearby foreign parts prefer not to pay—there are more than sufficient examples of this.

Effectively Russia has provided just over 3 trillion rubles' [R] worth of electricity free of charge over the past few years—they took it and did not pay! You might think that we were already living under communism.... No, not "we," but a great many enterprises and republics; and "we" are forced to pay over the odds for our light and heat.

The nuclear physicists work well. And the government understands this: It is no accident that the country's top leadership listened attentively to their problems. And hence the directors of Russia's AES's write in their appeal:

"We thank our government for the fine decisions aimed at stabilizing the financial position in nuclear power engineering which it made in October-December of last year and which have been sunk by the prevailing reality existing in our country, where it is not the decisions of the government or the president that are fulfilled, but those of structures of the type of the RAO 'YeES Russia' and people who prefer to burn scarce organic fuel, rather than deliver cheap power from AES's to consumers."

The directors go on to cite a surprising fact: "Of the credits worth R70 billion allocated by the government in October 1993 to pay for energy delivered from AES's, in three months only R6 billion has reached the AES's; R30 billion of the indicated sum for some reason was left in a commercial bank" (I omit the name of the bank so as not to give it further publicity—V.G.). True, the AES directors are mistaken here: The money was not "left" in this bank for two months, but was successfully "put to work"—it brought in to the bank twice the amount, since the "nuclear R30 billion" really "did its stuff." And very few employees of the bank cared that at some nuclear power stations employees are not receiving their pay....

No, the employees and directors of Russia's AES's are not threatening a strike: They understand full well how serious the situation is today in power engineering and industry, but are warning the president, the government, and all of us, that they will be forced to shut down AES's, since their duty as professionals and as human beings forbids them to allow new Chernobyls. The AES directors clearly state that they cannot allow the slightest risk in the operation of AES's. But, to be honest, the AES directors no longer hope for help from the government, since not one of its decisions has been fulfilled.

KAZAKHSTAN

Unexploded Nuclear Device Left Under Semipalatinsk Site

PM1401153194 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 3

[Anatoliy Ladin report under the "Events and Commentary" rubric: "Will Nuclear Charge Be Left to Our Descendants as a Memento? Semipalatinsk Test Site Continues To Pose Questions"]

[Text] At a meeting between Tulegen Zhukeyev, state counselor of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and journalists discussion again turned to the future of a nuclear device prepared for testing at the Semipalatinsk test site but still in an underground gallery, as the test site has been closed to date under an edict of the president of Kazakhstan. Nuclear tests have accordingly ended.

What, then, will become of the nuclear charge? What is its future? Could a spontaneous underground nuclear explosion eventually occur? These and other questions are worrying people.

The state counselor thinks the nuclear charge should be neutralized. However, according to him, Kazakhstan is unable to do this itself. Only those who prepared the charge and placed it underground for testing are capable of doing it.

However, as we have learned from informed sources, the nuclear charge's removal from the gallery entails very complicated engineering operations. This is not only expensive, it is dangerous too, as it was never planned that the device would be removed. It was prepared only for detonation and was carefully sealed up.

We have heard from certain officers at the test site that destroying the charge in situ would be the simplest and most expedient solution. That is to say, detonate it and let that be an end to the matter, particularly as its yield compared with those detonated at the test site in previous years is not very great.

But a new problem is coming to a head. The military unit which provided support services for tests at the Semipalatinsk site is being disbanded. Shortly there will be no one to remove or detonate the charge, depending on which decision is made. Perhaps our descendants will be left this "surprise" as a keepsake?

UKRAINE

Official Reaction on Denuclearization, Treaty Reported

Nuclear Status Favored

LD1101172294 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1551 GMT
11 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 11 Jan—Anatoliy Shybiko, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, noted in an interview with a UNIAR correspondent that without having in front of him the agreement on liquidating Ukraine's nuclear arsenal and without understanding its point, it would be premature to give a preliminary assessment of this agreement. In his opinion, a final assessment of the agreement should be given only after a text of the agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States becomes available. Mr. Shybiko is deeply convinced that Ukraine should remain a nuclear state for the near future and should accede to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a nuclear state.

Nuclear-Free Status Still Intended

*LD1201120594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1117 GMT 12 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev, 12 Jan—President Leonid Kravchuk's firm intention that the sovereign Ukraine should become a nuclear-free state has been confirmed once more today by Viktor Stelmakh, head of the press service of the Ukrainian president and Cabinet of Ministers, in a telephone conversation with the ITAR-TASS correspondent. The president acts consistently in the spirit of the resolution, passed by the country's Supreme Council, on Ukrainian ratification of the well-known treaty on the destiny of the nuclear weapons on its territory, the head of Kravchuk's press service pointed out.

The occasion for the conversation at 0930, during which a real official statement was made, was the coming visit to Ukraine today of U.S. President Bill Clinton for a meeting with Kravchuk. The head of Kravchuk's press service said Clinton's arrival from Prague was expected here this evening at 1900 and his stay would last about two and a half hours. The Kiev dialogue would center on fundamental questions for the signing in Moscow, currently in preparation, of the trilateral treaty on nuclear weapons.

Parliament Members Oppose Agreement

*LD1401200094 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Text] Opposition to concluding the trilateral American-Russian-Ukrainian agreement on nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory has sharply intensified in the parliament of Ukraine. Even moderate deputies now come out against the signing of such a document. According to them, the members of parliament were not even told about the treaty signed in Moscow by the presidents of the United States of America, Russia, and Ukraine.

In the opinion of the members of parliament, the signing of the Moscow treaty would mean that the president took a stand which totally differs from that approved by the parliament. The actions by Kravchuk play into the hands of Russia and the United States and were carried out by him under pressure, stated the members of parliament. Many of them say that they will come out against any attempt by President Kravchuk to ignore the reservations which were signed and expressed during the discussion dedicated to the ratification of the START I treaty. The communist deputies speak out for impeaching President Kravchuk if the trilateral Moscow agreement is signed.

Officers Union Favors Nuclear Status

*AU2001072494 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 14 Jan 94 p 3*

[Interview with Major General Oleksandr Rol, chairman of Ukraine's Officers Union, SOU, by Mariya Bazelyuk;

place and date not given: "The Defense of Ukraine Cannot be Guaranteed by Other States"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Excerpt] The Fifth Congress of the Ukraine's Officers Union [SOU] held in Kiev on 18 December 1993 elected Major General Oleksandr Rol as the SOU chairman. Rol was born in Kiev, where he completed high school and received training at an aviation club. He studied at the Chernihiv Aviation School and later graduated from the Military Aviation Academy. He was a fighter pilot, a bomber pilot, and also did staff work. For three years, he was adviser to the commander of the Vietnamese Air Force. Even though Rol's military service was almost entirely outside Ukraine, he speaks very good idiomatic Ukrainian and this points to his family's healthy roots. for the state. [passage omitted]

Bazelyuk: Did you take part in elaborating the Ukrainian Military Doctrine? What is your opinion about it?

Rol: It is centered on defense. The doctrine adopted by the Supreme Council in October 1993 has become a state document, which soldiers must adhere to rather than assess.

Bazelyuk: However, it is written in the doctrine that "Ukraine must become, in the future, a nonnuclear state if other nuclear powers undertake similar actions." After it became a state document, some people in the upper echelons of power rushed to transfer nuclear weapons immediately to Russia. What is your position with regard to our state's nuclear status?

Rol: Starting from 1991, I made many statements for the press and spoke from various rostrums. I said that Ukraine must have atomic weapons as a means of deterrence. Our state must possess nuclear weapons as long as at least one country, which may become our adversary and lead to a military confrontation, keeps its nuclear weapons. This is my opinion. No matter how big our army is, there is nothing like nuclear potential as a means for defending Ukraine.

The position of our political leadership has led to several negative processes. Back on 24 August 1991, Ukraine, for some reason, proclaimed to the whole world that it was going to become a nonnuclear state. Another example. Why, people are asking, does Ukraine need the Black Sea Fleet, if it declared that it only needs the fleet for local needs? This gave rise to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet with all its consequences. It is a pity that we gave away our tactical weapons so quickly; they might defend Ukraine much better than the largest army. It is impossible to guarantee national security without modern weapons.

Ukraine must proceed from the fact that it is impossible to ensure the defense of our state if we only rely upon guarantees offered by other states. In questions of Ukraine's defense capability and national security we may only rely upon our own forces.

Why does the West help Russia in every way? Simply because it has a powerful nuclear potential and is, in this respect, a strong power.

Bazelyuk: What are Ukraine's real possibilities for maintaining its nuclear status?

Rol: First and foremost, it is up to our president. We might conduct a nationwide referendum on Ukraine's nuclear or nonnuclear status. You know, I am very annoyed when some state tells us didactically: "You must give up your nuclear weapons." Who would dare make such claims upon China, Great Britain, or France?

Bazelyuk: How do you assess that the personnel of the 43d Rocket Army has not, to this day, taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine?

Rol: I will investigate this situation as chairman of the SOU.

Bazelyuk: You have been nominated as a candidate as Ukraine's people's deputy. Do you agree to stand for this post and why?

Rol: I agree, because I have a clear picture of my work in the Ukrainian Parliament.

Bazelyuk: Thank you for the interview, from which I have become convinced that, despite the enormous pressure exerted upon Ukraine both from the West and from the East, Ukraine will be able to create a reliable defensive shield with all those types of weapons necessary for this.

Mixed Reactions From Officials

*LD1501175694 Kiev UNIA in Ukrainian
0820 GMT 15 Jan 94*

[Text] Kiev, 14 Jan—Ukrainian Parliament Speaker Ivan Plyushch is refraining from comment on the matter of the signing of the tripartite American-Russian-Ukrainian agreement, in accordance with which Ukraine is getting rid of virtually all of its nuclear potential, before the relevant documents are studied. Serhiy Kolesnyk, a member of the Commission for Defense Issues, and Andriy Pecherov, a member of the Supreme Council presidium, have refused to comment on the fact of the signing of the document.

Volodymyr Shcherbyna, leader of the "New Ukraine" faction, assessed the fact of the signing of the treaty positively, on the whole. Giving the reasons for his stance, he asked his opponents to reply to the question of whether they could re-aim the Ukrainian missiles from facilities in the United States to similar facilities in Russia?

People's deputy Vladyslav Nosov, secretary to the Constitutional Commission, said that by signing the agreement in Moscow today the president of Ukraine had exceeded his authority, because in accordance with the current Constitution he does not have the right to dispose of Ukraine's state property (in accordance with the Vienna Convention, the 176 missiles and nuclear warheads on Ukrainian

territory are Ukraine's property). According to Nosov, Kravchuk's actions can be assessed as an act of "brutal arbitrariness." As regards impeachment, noted Nosov, the Constitutional Court, if there was one in Ukraine, would have to institute proceedings against the president of Ukraine. Nosov mentioned the vagueness of Ukrainian legislation as one of the reasons for Kravchuk violating the Constitution.

Mykhaylo Shvayko, deputy chairman of the Commission for Economic Reform, noted that the discussion of this treaty in parliament would be very stormy. It is not ruled out, emphasized Shvayko, that Kravchuk will provoke "impeachment" in the Supreme Council.

Volodymyr Kryuchkov, a member of the Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security, believes that implementation of this treaty is unrealistic both for Russia and for Ukraine.

It has been learned from informed sources that America is proposing compensation to Ukraine for the dismantlement of the missiles, which comes to approximately \$1 billion. But the dismantlement of one complex of SS-24 missiles costs not less than \$10 billion according to approximate calculations, and there are 46 such complexes in Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine currently has 136 (SS-18) missiles.

Conflicting Responses

*LD1501180794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1515 GMT 15 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Nekrasova]

[Text] Lvov, 15 Jan—The tripartite treaty on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which has been signed in Moscow, will make it possible to deepen cooperation between Ukraine and other states and will meet with the understanding and support of the world community. This view was expressed today by the Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Zlenko [name as heard], Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy, and Deputy Prime Minister Vasiliy Shmarov at a meeting with representatives of the diplomatic corps.

At the same time Ukrainian centrist and radical right-wing political parties showed a total lack of understanding of the signing of the treaty. In particular, the very large Rukh organization and the Conservative Republican Party assessed the actions taken by President Kravchuk as treachery. According to them, the document signed in Moscow covers not only liquid fuelled rockets but also solid fuelled ones, which are not even mentioned in the START I Treaty.

The pointer of the political barometer in Ukraine has moved toward tension. The sharp response has been softened to a certain extent by the Christmas holidays, which continue until 19 January.

Officials Speak Out

WS1701173494

[Editorial Report] Kiev Ukrainske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian at 1305 GMT on 17 January carries a NEZHAVISIMOST program. This program lasts 45 minutes and in its first part presents an interview with Aleksandr Chalyy, chairman of the Legal Department within the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, and Konstantin Trishchenko, chief of the Department for Control Over Weapons and Disarmament within the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry by correspondent Syarhey Omelchuk. The second part of the program is a live phone-in question-and-answer program. The subject of the cast addresses the activities of Ukraine in the denuclearization sphere and results of the tripartite Ukrainian-Russian-U. S. negotiations in Moscow.

At 1313 GMT, touching upon opinions of various political groupings regarding the Moscow agreement, Aleksandr Chalyy says that "this tripartite declaration is the logical continuation of Ukraine's political activities on the international arena," and it fully corresponds to clause No. 9 of the Declaration of the National Sovereignty of Ukraine. In addition, he recalls that 90 percent of the population backed the text of this Declaration and "the Supreme Council has ratified the START treaty with reservations." Responding to the reporter's question on whether nuclear weapons are a deterring factor in relations with Ukraine's neighbors, the chairman of the Legal Department states that this theory was born in the USSR, and it demands the existence of reliable nuclear weapons and an aggressive military policy. "Ukraine has no operational control over its nuclear weapons and this policy cannot be used by us. In addition, we cannot produce nuclear weapons," he adds.

At 1317, when asked to comment on security guarantees, Aleksandr Chalyy enumerates the principles—territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine—saying that this document will be published tomorrow. Further, the talk shifted to prospects of the political development of Crimea. However, Mr. Chalyy refuses to answer this question and says that time will show what happens, however, the nuclear disarmament process does not in any case affect the political processes in the Crimea. "There are many regions even in Russia that want to become independent, however, Russian diplomacy is very careful in meeting their demands."

At 1328 GMT, queried on the compensation mechanism, Konstantin Trishchenko recalls the Massandra agreement and Geneva negotiations on the issue and reminds that "Ukraine will receive free fuel for its nuclear power plants and new jobs will be created in the atomic power engineering field."

In the second part of the program, at 1337 GMT, the listeners again ask about security guarantees for Ukraine

and compensation for the Republic. Konstantin Trishchenko recommends that they read tomorrow's newspapers and repeats that the United States is a stable guarantor of Ukraine's security. Next, some listeners ask about the possibility of ratifying this agreement in the Supreme Council. Konstantin Trishchenko responds that the tripartite international treaty will be ratified "by all means."

The final questions [1345 GMT] concern the general situation in the world regarding the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The end of the program is unmonitored.

Maslin on Missile Dismantling

LD1801140794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1325 GMT 18 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow January 18 TASS—"We are able to remove all nuclear warheads stationed on the Ukrainian territory to Russia within a year for subsequent dismantling them at enterprises at which they were produced," Colonel-General Yevgeniy Maslin, a military expert for nuclear safety and a department chief of the Russian Defence Ministry, told a briefing here today.

He highly assessed an agreement on the removal of nuclear weapons from the Ukrainian territory, signed by the three presidents. Maslin reminded of the fact that talks on this problem had been going on since 1992 and it was only now that the talks came to a logical end.

Maslin informed journalists that currently, there are 176 launching installations of intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBM) in Ukraine, including 130 installations of SS-19 type and 46 of SS-24 type. There are also around 40 heavy bombers Tu-160 and Tu-95 capable of launching air-based long-range cruise missiles. The overall number of warheads stationed in Ukraine includes 1,300 warheads for IBM and over 600 warheads for air-based cruise missiles.

In the opinion of the military expert, nuclear safety in Ukraine causes permanent concern of experts. According to Maslin. Ammunition depots are overloaded with warheads and nuclear ammunition removed from combat alert, which resulted in a considerable increase of the radiation level. This was confirmed by experts of the Russian nuclear centre "Arzamas-15" who visited Ukraine in September, 1993.

The designed life of the majority of warheads has expired, while maintenance preventive checks had not been carried out and some missiles are currently in a critical condition. As an example, Maslin mentioned three nuclear warheads which had to be hastily removed from the Ukrainian territory as they were in a critical condition. It is difficult to say how many hazardous warheads are in Ukraine yet because there is a lack of experts exercising control over the safety of nuclear weapons, Maslin said.

The expert pointed out that any delay in removing and dismantling nuclear weapons is inadmissible since it is fraught with unpredictable consequences. However, there are still people in the republic who either do not realise this or are deliberately playing out "the nuclear card," he said.

Maslin pointed out that Russian experts can give Ukraine guarantees of safety of all operations in the process of removal and utilization of strategic weapons.

Further Maslin Comments

LD1801160694 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1336 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] A news conference was held at the Russian Ministry of Defense today. The military and political aspects of the Moscow summit meeting were discussed at the news conference. Viktor Levin, our observer, reports.

Levin: Colonel-General Maslin, chief of a main directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry, introduced by the Minister's Press Secretary (Yelena Agapova) as the chief specialist in the area of nuclear safety, dwelt in detail on the issue of the state of nuclear arms in Ukraine.

[Begin Maslin recording] In their statement, the presidents emphasized the importance of ensuring the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons until they are dismantled. However, nuclear safety in Ukraine is continuing to get worse. Storage facilities are more than full with warheads and nuclear ammunition which have been stood down. This is impermissible. Apart from everything else, it has resulted in a considerable increase in background radiation. This is confirmed by the chief design specialists from Arzamas-16 who visited the territory of Ukraine, Pervomaysk, in September last year.

Guarantees on most spare parts have run out. Regular technical servicing is not being done everywhere. The findings of the chief designers who investigated those three munitions, you remember, the ones which were sent from Ukraine because they were in a very dangerous state, landed on my desk yesterday.

Specialists are neither trained nor retrained in educational centers. Due to a lack of effective control, the personnel's theoretical knowledge and practical skills have been substantially lost and this engenders a great deal of doubt with regard to their capability for getting the work carried out with any degree of quality.

Due to lack of equipment and absence of field training, the special emergency repair crews are not in practical terms ready to carry out tasks dealing with the elimination of the consequences of possible accidents involving nuclear ammunition. There is a great deal more besides, affecting the servicing and maintenance.

Well, and it is in a situation such as this that proposals emerge within the military circles of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry to have the munitions moved to a former

engineer depot, to have them stored there for a so-called interim period. Apart from everything else, this is very dangerous. [end recording]

Levin: I asked a question whether it is really the case that Ukraine fails to understand that keeping nuclear weapons in such a poor technical state poses a threat to Ukraine itself. Here is General Maslin's reply.

[Begin Maslin recording] There exists, well, I am in touch with my Ukrainian colleagues practically from the very inception of the negotiating process. There are sensible people there who do understand this. However, there are also people—and I am not afraid to say so—who fail to understand this danger.

For some fifty minutes I had to address some committee, I no longer recall what they call it, the defense and security committee of the Ukrainian parliament. For fifty minutes I told them, in great detail, what nuclear ammunition is, what danger it poses, in the first place for Ukraine, but the questions that came afterwards dealt mainly with the costs—how much if we sell it to you. That is to say—I would not like to offend anyone by this—but nonetheless, the statements, you have after all noticed that statements have appeared in the press alleging treachery, well, these are the people who do not understand and they fall into one category.

There is a second category of people who do understand, but who wish to retain their positions in the new structures that emerged there to supervise the nuclear weapons. My former subordinates are there, too, working and unwilling, to some extent, to part with these weapons and probably this can serve as an explanation. [end recording]

Levin: The trilateral agreement between Russia, Ukraine and the USA removes financial problems. It is now up to the Ukrainian parliament and its political will.

More on Maslin Briefing

PM1901133594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Jan 94 p 3

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "Why Russia Is Concerned"]

[Text] The Russian Defense Ministry held a press conference for Russian and foreign journalists devoted to the military-political aspects of the Russian and U.S. presidents' Moscow summit meeting. Leading experts in the nuclear missile sphere—Colonel General Yevgeniy Maslin, chief of a Russian Defense Ministry main directorate; Major General Anatoliy Svetikov, first deputy chief of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff Operational Directorate; Major General Anatoliy Lukyanov, deputy chief of the Russian Defense Ministry International Treaty Directorate; and Boris Gorobets, spokesman for the Ministry of Atomic Energy—answered journalists' questions.

They all revealed the complexity not only of the military-political, but also of the military-technical aspects of the problem of the nuclear potential in Ukraine and once

again underlined not only the political significance of the tripartite agreement on eliminating these weapons, but also the considerable contribution it makes to strengthening nuclear security—provided that the matter is resolved positively. Col. Gen. Yevgeniy Maslin reminded the press conference that it is a question of around 1,300 warheads [boyegolovka] for SS-19 and SS-24 missiles and 600 air-launched cruise missile warheads [golovnaya boyevaya chast]. The general said that this arsenal causes most profound concern in Russia.

The point is that the state of these warheads is still deteriorating. The warranty periods of most of the munitions' components are expiring and they are not undergoing the requisite technical maintenance, while maintenance personnel lack the requisite level of both theoretical and practical training. The complexity of the situation is indicated not least by the fact that three warheads were recently delivered to Russia from Ukraine in a preaccident state.

Our country does indeed have the technology to dismantle and salvage the nuclear munitions, but time is pressing on. It is no coincidence that it was specifically said during the summit meeting that the first consignment of 200 warheads must arrive at Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy enterprises for elimination within the next 10 months.

Nor has Kiev's desire for material compensation been forgotten—in exchange for the aforementioned first [consignment of] 200 warheads Ukraine will receive 100 fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations from Russia. Further payments are to be determined. If that does not seem enough to Ukraine, it was said at the press conference, the following legitimate question arises: Perhaps Ukraine does not want to part with its nuclear arms, contrary to its own declarations?

The press conference did not overlook the problem of mutual nontargeting of strategic nuclear missiles, enshrined in the Moscow declaration signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton. When asked by your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent whether this clause contravenes the status of nuclear weapons as a means of deterring an aggressor (as in the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine") Generals Anatoliy Lukyanov and Anatoliy Svetikov replied that our nuclear arsenal does of course retain the functions of deterrence and intimidation. The fact that the missiles will not be targeted at the United States and Russia respectively in everyday life, a sign of the new quality of the partnership relations between the two countries, is another matter. Since the missiles nonetheless remain on alert duty, we can always resume the possibility of their combat use if necessary.

Presidential Adviser Interviewed

BR1901164594 Brussels L'ECHO in French
19 Jan 94 p 4

[Interview with Anton Buteyko, Ukrainian presidential adviser, by Francoise Delstanche in Brussels on 18 January: "Kiev Expresses its Faith in the Face of the Agreement on Denuclearization"; first four paragraphs are L'ECHO introduction]

[Text] Anton Buteyko believes that the West is focussing too much attention on nuclear affairs. Moderately optimistic about the nuclear agreement for the future since, according to him, the president has met Parliament's demands, Kravtchuk's adviser sees no progress being made on the dossier regarding the Black Sea fleet.

The tripartite agreement between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, signed last Friday in Moscow, was saluted yesterday by the European Union as "an important contribution to international security and stability," albeit on condition that it be implemented rapidly, failing which any delay would be considered with great anxiety.

The practical implementation of the agreement effectively depends on the backing of the Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev. Not directly, but with respect to the conditions that it imposed on the ratification of the Start I agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, and on the ratification of the treaty on nuclear nonproliferation, both of which Washington had laid down as preconditions. However, the Ukrainian leaders are proving relatively confident on these points. That is what was explained to us yesterday by Anton Buteyko in an interview given while passing through Brussels. However, he believes that the West is focussing too much attention on the nuclear problem and forgetting that other elements are emerging as definitely just as important. Consequently, he argues, the development of equal relations with the European Union would contribute to the stability of the region.

Moreover, in his opinion, only Ukraine can check the pressure in Russia caused by new political forces like that of Zhirinovskiy. For, in his view, the renaissance of these fascist movements is a menace not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe as a whole.

Delstanche: Do you think it will be easy to obtain the Ukrainian Parliament's support for the tripartite agreement on denuclearization?

Buteyko: The agreement does not formally require ratification. On the other hand, when Parliament ratified the Start I treaty, it voiced a certain number of reservations, in particular concerning the security guarantee for Ukraine, and the provision of technological and financial assistance in the context of disarmament. In fact, it must be clear that when Start I was negotiated, all the arms to be destroyed had to be eliminated using the combined economic resources of the USSR as a whole, whereas now we would have to destroy them using our own resources. That, however, is impossible in view of the economic crisis ravaging our country. Furthermore, the destruction of this arsenal will benefit the Western nations at which the arms in question were aimed. Therefore, it is logical that they should contribute to that process, for we are contributing to their security. Then again, Parliament has asked for compensation for the material contained in the tactical and strategic arms handed over to Russia.

In addition, it must be remembered that the negotiations were launched at the initiative of Ukraine, but that neither

the United States nor Russia took our interests into account. It was Parliament's decision regarding the Start I treaty that provided a positive impulse in the negotiations. All the more so since we also understood that it was impossible to resolve certain matters on a bilateral basis.

Delstanche: So what is the next stage in the implementation of this agreement?

Buteyko: The president could now come to the Parliament and explain that he has met the conditions laid down when Start I was ratified, and that this treaty can now take effect. It will then be up to Parliament to approve the president's arguments, or not.

We think that Parliament will give us the green light, and we are going to work toward that. Admittedly, the approach of the March elections could lead some members of Parliament to exploit this to further their own personal interests, but despite all that I am continuing to hope that the "ayes" will have it.

Delstanche: And do you imagine achieving this during the present legislative period, which will end next March?

Buteyko: It is still our intention to achieve Parliament's backing, but if we do not, then we will be back in charge under the next Parliament.

Delstanche: A debate flared up last September between Kiev and Moscow regarding an agreement on the sale of the Ukrainian share of the Black Sea fleet to Russia in return for the cancellation of the bilateral debt. What stage have the talks on this subject reached?

Buteyko: At the end of the meeting on 3 September 1993, a joint press release stipulated that the two delegations had to draw up recommendations over the following months on all the decisions made within that context, while taking account of all the ideas expressed and the specific agreements already concluded at that meeting. Since then, there have been two rounds of talks, but the Russians intend to consider only their own proposals.

Meanwhile, we have said that Ukraine would agree to divide the fleet in two, but not the associated elements of infrastructure. The Russians can by all means pay for using those.

Delstanche: And what about the bilateral debt? Is the fate of this debt still in abeyance?

Buteyko: Everyone in the West forgets that in September 1992 the heads of state of the CIS agreed to share out the property of the former USSR among the new states. Under the terms of this agreement, Ukraine should have received 16 percent of the assets of the old state, as well as gold and diamond reserves. However, Moscow never implemented this agreement. If our energy debt is compared with the Russian failure to return these assets to Ukraine, then it is Russia which is indebted to us, not the other way round.

Having said that, the tripartite agreement included the provision that compensation for the material contained in the arms will more or less cover the bilateral debt. The experts must now decide on the value of this material.

Delstanche: There are some people in Ukraine who seem to think that this agreement constitutes a victory for Russia above all...

Buteyko: This trilateral agreement opens up the way to the destruction of the nuclear monster, and the whole world will gain from this. However, even more specifically, it is Ukraine which insisted on continuing the negotiations on guarantees and compensation, and that is the reason why things have now been resolved.

So you can judge who the victor is. Which does not mean to say that Russia and the United States are also gaining from it.

Delstanche: Can Ukraine have faith in the Russian commitments regarding its security?

Buteyko: This aspect of the agreement still depends on the Ukrainian Parliament's ratification of the treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. However, if that is the case, then the two countries, the United States and Russia, undertake to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as well as the inviolability of its borders. In the past, this had never been recognized in any document coming from Moscow. Admittedly, in the past, many agreements have not been implemented, but now the United States is a party to the agreement, which gives us cause to hope that it will be respected.

MP Tarasenko Views Agreement

*LD2301121694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0920 GMT 23 Jan 94*

[Text] The trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of our state remains the focus of attention. If, in the world as a whole this move is supported on a mass scale, in Ukraine attitudes toward this statement and its assessments are ambiguous. Our correspondent Petro Ostapenko met Oleksandr Tarasenko, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine's Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security, and asked him to express his attitude toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia.

[Begin recording] **Ostapenko:** Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk and representatives of the executive bodies of power are saying today that the trilateral statement is the result and continuation, let us say, of the decisions by the Supreme Council on nuclear weapons. Oleksandr, what is your opinion? Is this true?

Tarasenko: Well, this document still needs in-depth comprehension. First, it is called a statement, a trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States,

and Russia. How should we assess it today? Does it have a legal force as an international document and as an agreement, or is this just a statement? Upon studying it profoundly—yesterday our commission was considering this document—upon studying it profoundly, it can, in the long run, be qualified as an international agreement. In compliance with our current legislation—the Constitution first and foremost—and in compliance with the law on the president, on his plenary powers, the international agreements that Ukraine—that is, the executive power, concludes in the field of defense, military construction, military relations with neighboring and other states, are subject to mandatory ratification by the Supreme Council.

Why did I say that this document is an agreement and not a statement? Because, there is a supplement to the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia as of 14 January, and this supplement provides specific dates, the terms in which our strategic nuclear weapons should be fully deactivated, their number, and so on. This goes beyond the limits of the resolution that was adopted by the Supreme Council. What does this supplement stipulate? This supplement gives, for example, such parameters: Ukraine ensures the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons—that is, strategic air force, TU-160 and other aircraft carrying nuclear missiles, located on its territory, in compliance with its relevant agreements within the term of seven years as is envisaged by the START I Treaty and within the context of the statement by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on Ukraine's non-nuclear status, all the RS-22 missiles—to be more specific they are called SS-24—on Ukraine's territory will be deactivated within 10 months by means of removing their warheads. What does it mean?

You know that in two thirds of our silos, launcher vehicles are filled with liquid fuel—that is, heptyl. The entire world already knows what kind of a liquid fuel this is. This heptyl is a super poisonous substance, and the launcher vehicle itself is even a bigger powder keg than the launcher vehicle and the warhead as a whole. Proceeding from this, Ukraine and its plenary bodies and persons must take into account their own interests, first and foremost, and not the interests of those who benefit from this unilaterally. I believe that the Supreme Council, either the present or the future one, should seriously ponder over this document, and it can be ratified only after its parameters are specified.

Ostapenko: I am sorry to interrupt you. You have just read out the item that has to do with all sides without exception. But nothing is said here about the Supreme Council resolution on the ratification of START I with reservations. It clearly stipulates that 36 percent of launcher vehicles and 42 percent of warheads are subject to elimination today. That is to say, these parameters have been extended to all nuclear [word indistinct].

Tarasenko: Absolutely. They run contrary to the Supreme Council resolution. The Supreme Council resolution and START I envisage percentage and here is says about the complete elimination.

In this connection I would like to say the following, so that our radio listeners and our compatriots, our half-brothers, as they say, would know it: All those strategic nuclear systems located on the territory of Ukraine are targeted at certain objectives in the United States of America and relevant bases beyond the borders of the U.S. Correspondingly, approximately the same number of nuclear weapons are targeted at our territory. Well, this is military strategy and tactics and there is nothing incomprehensible here. Everybody understands this: If you target me, then I target you. But this document should also envisage adequate moves on the part of the United States of America, and our control over this, because everyone will control us, control how we eliminate nuclear weapons, remove nuclear warheads, transfer them from Ukraine to Russia. The only thing envisaged here is that Ukraine will have the possibility to control Russia neutralizing the nuclear warheads. However, this agreement does not envisage what the United States will do with that quantity of strategic nuclear weapons that are targeted at us, and what will be Ukraine's role in carrying out control over this process, as far as the actions of the United States are concerned.

Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin declared that they would decode their missiles, which would then be retargeted at some deserted islands, or something like that. Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged, is that right?

Tarasenko: Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged. Moreover, I disagree with such a stand, just as a citizen and just as an inhabitant of this planet Earth. If Ukraine eliminates these weapons, the former weapons of the Soviet Union, as is known, then the United States of America should eliminate and neutralize the same quantity of weapons. This is what we are talking about, not about retargeting at some other states, and so on. That is to say, there is no alternative in the world to universal nuclear disarmament and appropriate actions by all nuclear states. This is what our politicians should insist on, and at this point I again repeat and emphasize that the given document needs in-depth comprehension in legal terms, in terms of international law. What obligations, what guarantees can we talk about? Because, they already guaranteed us something to a certain extent. Let us not mention any names today, because there has already been enough talk about this. Who is to blame and who, let us say, ordered the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine? Those are our weapons. They would have been of paramount importance for the defense capacity of Ukraine. However, we transferred those weapons and could not cope with these ones. Here we outwitted ourselves.

Ostapenko: I know, Oleksandr, that you are familiar with the technical condition of the strategic nuclear weapons, missiles, and warheads located on Ukraine's territory. Today, in numerous interviews, the military say that it is difficult for Ukraine to service them, that Ukraine will be unable to service them, therefore, the sooner we deactivate and transfer these weapons, the better for Ukraine. What do you think about it, please.

Tarasenko: You, Petro, probably touched upon a very important aspect of this problem. It is quite clear that nuclear warheads and their systems are the most sophisticated systems because they should be sophisticated as they guarantee the safety of a nuclear warhead itself and a silo as a whole. This is why there exists a practice in the world according to which the given warheads are serviced by the authors who manufactured them. The authors themselves can destroy them. There is no other process, as they say. In this respect, we could find a state that would do this [word indistinct] but we cannot do this without Russia because the one who will have access there should know what it is, and so on. Therefore, every launching system and, moreover, nuclear warhead has relevant terms which guarantee their safety, and systems. We cannot do this without Russia. Therefore, it is necessary either to have very specific, responsible bilateral agreements toward that end with Russia on ensuring periodic servicing of the warheads and the silos as a whole or to neutralize and transfer them after their guaranteed service life expires. There is no other way around. Also, it could be possible to do as follows: A certain number of warheads and silos could be dismantled without their periodic servicing after their guaranteed service life expires. This is the way to follow. This would be the most correct, most appropriate way. Following it, one should move from the warhead, from the head, as they say, to the tail. That is to say, to dismantle the entire silo and not just remove the warheads and leave the rest with ourselves. It would be the same kind of a powder keg. Therefore, the most correct way is to act in line with a stage-by-stage, unit-by-unit principle. Both the warhead and the launcher vehicle should be dismantled completely. This would ensure the highest level of security to our state.

Ostapenko: One more, very important aspect, as far as this problem is concerned. Did you see the guarantees of Ukraine's national security in this statement and in the supplement, the guarantees that Ukraine and the Supreme Council were striving for and which all those living in Ukraine wish to have.

Tarasenko: Undoubtedly, there are certain aspects and elements of security here. There are such provisions, and so on. But, as they say, history and mankind know instances when such guarantees were given, when there were agreements, but there was the Second World War despite these bilateral and multilateral agreements, and 22 million people died and the economies in a whole number of countries were destroyed. This is why one should rely on God but have his own mind, as they say. Both our military and scientific potentials should work toward ensuring our state security—not at the expense of nuclear weapons now but at the expense of other highly effective means. Such measures are being taken today. This is why, simultaneously with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, fulfilling that resolution by the Supreme Council, we should work concurrently toward ensuring the combat readiness of our Armed Forces. Our commission, together with military departments, is carrying out this work. [end recording]

Announcer: Such is the attitude of people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security Oleksandr Tarasenko toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Kravchuk Letter to Parliament Urges Joining NPT

*LD2501182694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1806 GMT 25 Jan 94*

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik]

[Text] Kiev, January 25 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk called upon the parliament to revise its attitude towards the ratification of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) and the 1992 Lisbon Protocol.

An official letter by the president insisting that Ukraine should join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] was distributed among Ukrainian lawmakers on Tuesday.

Last November the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START-I imposing several tough conditions and stating that Ukraine should not join the NPT.

Ukraine's membership of the NPT was one of the key issues of the tripartite meeting of the Russian, American and Ukrainian presidents in Moscow.

The Ukrainian parliament is to consider the Moscow statement of the three presidents later this week.

Parliament Speaker Cited

*LD2501133794 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian
1245 GMT 25 Jan 94*

[Excerpts] Kiev, 25 Jan—The Supreme Council of Ukraine began its session today under the chairmanship of Speaker Ivan Plyushch. [passage omitted]

With regard to the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty, Ivan Plyushch said that the last time parliament discussed the issue was on 18 November 1993, when it adopted reservations concerning ratification of the START treaty. Since then, the president of Ukraine has carried out a great deal of work which resulted in the signing of the Moscow statement.

Plyushch said the president of Ukraine requested the Supreme Council to examine the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. However, the Supreme Council's three standing commissions which met 24 January with the participation of the working group dealing with ratification of the treaty, failed to find a common solution.

The parliament speaker said that this afternoon's session of the Supreme Council will look at the resolution on the state privatization program for 1994.

Kravchuk Accused of 'High Treason'

AU2601141094 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Commentary by Ihor Nedyukha, candidate of technological sciences: "Once Again About the 'Shield' and 'Sword'"]

[Text] According to the press, the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly [UNA] has sent the chairman of Ukraine's Security Service, Ye. Marchuk, a statement (the text was supplied), containing a request to evaluate President L. Kravchuk's activity during the negotiations with the presidents of the United States and Russia on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. This statement, in fact, accuses the Ukrainian president of violations of the law to the extent of high treason.

However, the impression arises that the UNA leadership had not read Marchuk in HOLOS UKRAYINY 12 December 1992 where he insisted on the expediency of Ukraine's staying under the "nuclear shield of Russia," in other words, on the current policy of the total nuclear disarmament of Ukraine.

For that reason, I find it inappropriate to demand that Marchuk does the evaluation. This conclusion does not only apply to the UNA appeal, but also to the analogous statement by the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party [UKRP].

The validity of the above interpretation is confirmed, at least, by the fact that the transfer to Russia of the "Sword"—the tactical nuclear weapons—is known to have been completed on the night of 5 and 6 May 1992.

It remains to be hoped that opponents of the Ukrainian president in the ranks of the UNA and UKRP will also agree that the same people must be among those who have planned and those who are implementing the measures for withdrawing the entire "Sword" and "Shield" (strategic nuclear weapons) complex from Ukraine.

Minister Criticizes Disarmament Plan

MK2601104094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 26 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian environment minister and head of a parliamentary working group on START I and nuclear disarmament, by Vladimir Skachko: "'This Is Not Disarmament but Disrobing (razdevaniye, also meaning 'robbing') of the State.' The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Can Give a Legal Assessment of the Moscow Statement by the Three Presidents"—first paragraph is introduction; place, date not given]

[Text] Ivan Plyushch, speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, has stated that the Supreme Soviet must decide on the question of compatibility of Ukraine's national interests with the statement signed by presidents of the United States, Ukraine, and Russia on the future of the Ukrainian strategic missiles and also consider a draft resolution on

Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. According to Ivan Plyushch, because the resolution on joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was prepared by the presidential services, the report on this matter should be made by President Leonid Kravchuk. Yuriy Kostenko, head of a special working deputies group on preparing the START I Treaty and on Ukraine's acquiring a nonnuclear status, and minister for environmental protection, commented for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the deputies' decision to return to these matters.

Kostenko: The Moscow tripartite statement has actually offered quite a different scheme of nuclear disarmament for Ukraine than what was decided on this score by our Supreme Soviet. This scheme does not take many aspects into account either from the viewpoint of national security or from the viewpoint of our economic interests. Therefore the Moscow statement must be considered in full as a separate agreement and be given an appropriate legal assessment.

Skachko: But this is a statement, not an agreement. The parliament may neither ratify it, nor fail to ratify it.

Kostenko: I understand this. The statement has been made in such a way that it could not be submitted to the consideration of the Supreme Soviet. This is so-called legal chicanery. Now, Ukraine's supreme legislative body adopts one scheme of nuclear disarmament while the executive branch, contrary to this, proposes a totally different one. Therefore the Supreme Soviet, in line with the current constitution and entitled to consider all international agreements, is also to consider this document as well as give it a proper legal appraisal and establish whether it is good for Ukraine. Possibly, it will have to be vetoed as a document which contradicts Ukraine's national interests.

Skachko: And presumably the parliament resolution on this question must be enforced?

Kostenko: This is undoubtedly the power of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, I would like to point out that the work conducted by the Supreme Soviet will allow, in my opinion, more or less to balance Ukraine's interests with the interests of those who insist that Ukraine become nuclear-free. In the Moscow document I do not see either the economic interests or guarantees of Ukraine's security that many are talking about so much.

Skachko: How would you comment on the view that neither the statement nor the appendix to it contains a word on compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons evacuated to Russia?

Kostenko: This only shows once again that there is a certain contradiction between what our Supreme Soviet has adopted and what our president has signed. The parliament resolution clearly says that compensation must be made also for the tactical nuclear weapons, while the

Moscow statement does not say anything about this separately. As far as I know, Russia apparently promises to consider this issue and provide some compensation after all.

Skachko: In other words, compensation for tactical nuclear weapons is a subject of separate talks between Ukraine and Russia?

Kostenko: Yes, talks on this issue have been going on, but it has not been settled conclusively yet because experts have been tasked to consider it and establish how exactly compensation will be made.

Skachko: Has any time frame been defined for making compensation to Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons?

Kostenko: No, no term has been established. This is very difficult to do because no one knows with what funds compensation will be made. If from the proceeds of the 500 tonnes of enriched uranium that Russia is to sell to the United States, then this can happen only after this uranium has been sold on the world market. Only then will Russia start partially to receive real money and, naturally, will be able to make some compensation to Ukraine. At present, however, no such funds are available. True, there is also another option (which, incidentally, would be the most adequate for Ukraine): to evaluate the cost of each warhead. This is possible because it is known how much uranium and plutonium there is in each warhead. Therefore, using an equivalent, one could estimate the value of the tactical nuclear weapons that we have transferred to Russia. According to our preliminary estimates, the value is \$10 billion. Assuming this sum, Russia is already in debt to Ukraine—not the other way around, as some are trying to have us believe today. And if we talk about energy, then, given that uranium and plutonium are very valuable energy carriers, an equivalent exchange scheme could be used: We deliver highly enriched uranium and plutonium to them, and they supply us with oil and gas. But unfortunately this option has not been used; moreover, during the talks the subject of "plutonium" was somehow lost altogether. And it is a very costly element: one kilogram of enriched plutonium, according to various estimates, can cost up to \$1 million, and one kilogram of enriched uranium up to \$100,000. Now you can imagine the value of the material assets that we have already transferred to Russia.

Skachko: How much uranium and plutonium have you transferred to Russia?

Kostenko: Approximately 10 tonnes of enriched plutonium and more than 90 tonnes of enriched uranium.

Skachko: What is the correlation in parliament of people who advocate a solution of the problem of Ukraine's nuclear weapons on terms favorable for it and those who are ready to give the missiles away?

Kostenko: Judging by the results of voting during the ratification of START I, it can be said that the majority of

parliament members are inclined toward organizing a normal nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. But what has happened in Moscow is not nuclear disarmament but the disrobing of the state. In the military, economic, and political sense.

Warheads Removal Said To Take More Than a Year

WS1701213894 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1735 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Round-table studio discussion on the program "Nonnuclear Ukraine" including Ivan Oliynyk, the Ukrainian deputy defense minister for armaments issues and a scientist; the general manager of the Kharkiv Physical Institute; chief of the Strategic Troops Administration at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry; the commander of the 43rd Rocket Army; and the deputy chief of the department for scientific issues at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Unidentified announcer: Since there are certain complications ahead, I think it is too early to speak about the transportation of Ukrainian nuclear ammunition to Russia as an accomplished fact. Could you please tell us how long it may take to implement this process? It is not going to happen overnight, is it?

Unidentified speaker in Russian: I completely agree with you that this process will not be completed in one year. This is a lengthy process that will depend on technical conditions and safe transportation capabilities. To this end, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry is putting together timetables and plans to precisely observe each provision and rule out any off-chance accident. We cannot be even an iota wrong. This is why meeting all safety requirements for transportation will call for a considerable amount of time and effort on the part of the Defense Ministry officials and military officers who are experts on this issue.

In addition, the transportation and preparation for it will involve Russian specialists who developed and utilized this nuclear ammunition. Everyone is asking today: When will the first and the last [warhead] be removed? The defense minister has made it perfectly clear: The state has to have state secrets. Today, making public when a nuclear load will be transported through the Ukrainian territory—which is a distance of from 721 km to 1223 km to our eastern border... This is a long distance. And we must secure safe conditions for this transportation. [passage omitted]

Attempt To Smuggle Enriched Uranium to Near East Foiled

LD1301201894 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0525 GMT 13 Jan 94

[From the "News for Business People" program]

[Text] An attempt to smuggle 1.5 kilograms of enriched uranium has been cut short in Odessa. According to information from employees of the criminal investigation

department, the radioactive material was not stolen in the Ukraine. The criminals obtained it from one of the former Soviet republics via the territory of Moldova. The criminal group planned to sell uranium in a Near East country for \$1.2 million. According to employees of the investigation group, such an amount of enriched uranium is valued at \$10 million abroad.

Zaporozhye AES Director Deplores State of Nuclear Plants

*LD2501162494 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 94*

[Text] According to (Vladimir Bronnikov), director of the Zaporozhye nuclear power station, Ukraine's nuclear plants are in a most grave condition. Interviewed by RIA, he noted that there is no means to pay AES personnel for their work properly or to buy fuel, equipment, and spares. In this situation highly qualified specialists are defecting en masse to Russia's nuclear facilities. All this, (Bronnikov) stressed, puts Ukrainian nuclear power engineers in extreme conditions, which is impermissible if atomic power stations are to function normally.

Expert Views Nuclear Power Sector Situation 'Catastrophic'

*WS2001161794 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI
in Russian 15 Jan 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Nuclear Experts Warn: Uncontrolled Economic Processes May Begin"]

[Text] Vasily Kotko, deputy chairman of the State Committee for the Use of Nuclear Power, has deemed as "catastrophic" the current situation in the nuclear power sector. According to him, there have been no purchases of nuclear fuel since the middle of 1993 due to a lack of funds. In 1993, the volume of nuclear fuel purchases decreased twofold, as compared to 1990. The same reasons hampered the dumping of nuclear fuel residue.

Kotko points out that the National Control Center of the Ukrainian Ministry of Power, the committee's primary and only consumer irregularly pays for received nuclear electric power. The ministry owes nuclear power stations some 550 billion karbovanetses.

Kotko underlines that the sector has exhausted its resources and if the situation remains unchanged uncontrolled processes will begin. If fuel is not bought the industry will be unable to function.

FRANCE

Commentator Weighs Pros, Cons of Super-Phoenix Reactivation

BR2001141394 Paris LE MONDE in French
20 Jan 94 p 11

[Commentary by Jean-Francois Augereau and Jean-Paul Dufour: "Superphenix Reactor: A Political Choice"]

[Text] Following the Nuclear Safety Directorate's recommendation on Tuesday [18 January] that the Super-Phoenix reactor should be reactivated under certain conditions, the debate on the Creys-Malville superbreeder reactor has reentered the economic and political arena.

By requesting an in-depth reassessment of "all financial, legal, and social aspects of the installation," opponents are hitting the right target. It no longer is a matter of criticizing security alone. Even the danger posed by the fires caused by leaked sodium, which were very difficult to control, was played down in the expert report.

It is now up to the politicians to decide whether or not to continue the development of this technology, which, as everybody agrees, will not be economically viable for several decades. One kW/h produced by the Super-Phoenix prototype is 2.3 times more expensive than 1 kW/h generated by a conventional nuclear power station. This fact, together with the collapse of the uranium market and the freeze in nuclear programs, seems to argue against the construction of a superbreeder reactor network.

So, should we halt this program for good? This would cost us a little fortune, both for decommissioning the reactor and for indemnifying France's [foreign] partners. Should we opt, instead, to continue this program and try to make a little profit out of the installation by having it generate kW/h and incinerate small quantities of waste? The latter solution would keep the research teams busy and enable us to keep current of developments in this technology should it one day become economically viable.

Pending this decision, the reactor operator and the political authorities are working on the financial figures. Super-Phoenix required an investment of 27.7 billion French francs [Fr] (current francs), including Fr7.65 billion in intercalated interests [interets intercalaires]. Moreover, the superbreeder reactor costs more when it is idle (Fr750 to 800 million per year) than when it is operating normally (Fr650 million). However, this has to be weighed against the political pressure emanating from ecological groups, for whom Superphenix has become the symbol of the nuclear danger that has to be eradicated.

TURKEY

Alleged Drug, Arms Smuggler Found Dead

NC2101095294 Ankara TURKISH DAILY NEWS
in English 17 Jan 94 p 2

[Text] Ankara—Behcet Canturk, one of the prominent figures of the Turkish drug and arms smuggling world, was

killed on Saturday [15 January]. Canturk who was also the sponsor of the pro-Kurdish paper "Ozgur Gundem" was found dead, along with his driver, near the Sapanca district of Sakarya.

The examination of the two unidentified bodies, which were found on the TEM highway near Kirkpinar, Sapanca, has revealed that one of the bodies belonged to Canturk. The other body next to Canturk, who was shot once in the mouth, was identified as belonging to his driver Recep Kuzucu. There were no identity cards on the bodies, which were taken to the mortuary of the Sakarya State Hospital where they were identified by their relatives.

Security officials, who stated that there were many empty cartridges in the area where the bodies were found, said that investigations were underway. Drawing attention to the fact that the conflict among drug smugglers has recently become tense, the officials said that the smugglers were settling accounts among themselves for reasons which were as yet unknown. "The men may have been killed as a result of this power struggle," the officials added.

Born in Lice, Diyarbakir in 1950, Canturk committed his first murder at the age of 15 when he was a student at a junior high school. After serving a prison term of one year, Canturk was released under an amnesty of the time. In 1969, during an inter-tribe struggle, he murdered another person. Security forces were unable to catch him and he committed two more murders while at large.

When he turned himself in to the police in 1971, he was set free again in 1974 in accordance with a further amnesty.

Canturk, who was the leader of the Canturk tribe in the town of Lice in the province of Diyarbakir, settled in Istanbul in 1979. He started to deal with arms and drug smuggling from that time. Canturk, whose mother and whose second wife were both of Armenian origin, was taken into custody following the coup of Sept. 12, 1980 and tried in the case publicly referred to as the "The Case of the Godfathers." The charges were of providing financial support to the Armenian terrorist organization, ASALA [Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia], and to the outlawed Kurdish organization Progressive Eastern Cultural Clubs (DDKD). The prosecutor demanded capital punishment for Canturk, but he was acquitted after a series of hearings.

Canturk was also tried at the Diyarbakir Military Court on charges of smuggling heroin to European countries by sea. He was acquitted due to lack of evidence.

In 1991, he started to publish the pro-Kurdish daily Ozgur Gundem with Yasar Kaya. Although he was financing the paper, he had left the auditing of the paper's accounts to another person in line with the company's statutes.

Russian-U.S. Statement on Nonproliferation
LD1401123294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1151 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] [No dateline as received]

Joint Statement
by the President of the Russian Federation and
the President of the United States
on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
and the Means of Their Delivery

President Yeltsin and President Clinton, during their meeting in Moscow on 14 January 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the cold war. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons created a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

—Considering the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to this treaty.

—They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II Treaties.

—They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and comply strictly with their nonproliferation obligations.

—They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.

—They supported the nuclear suppliers group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.

—They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. They declared their

firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.

—They noted that an important contribution to the goal of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.

—They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.

—They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:

—including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities associated with activities having direct national security significance;

—steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the progress of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.

—The presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of nonproliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.

—They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.

—The presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.

Both presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

—As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the convention not later than 1995.

—To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming memorandum of understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons.

—The presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They applauded the joint chemical weapons destruction work plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide additional 30 million dollars in assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction programme.

—They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russian-American-British statement of September 1992, which provides *inter alia* for the visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance with the convention.

—They supported convening a special conference of the states' parties to the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the convention and its effectiveness.

The presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

—They welcomed the conclusion of the bilateral memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America signed in September 1993, noted the importance of this agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.

—The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitation of its membership at an early date. The Russian Federation and the United States of America are certain that further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.

The presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of nonproliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on nonproliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

—They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honour fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, *inter alia*, through dialogue between IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the joint declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

—They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multi-lateral forum to consider measures in the field of arms control in nonproliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the treaty banning nuclear weapons test explosions and the proposed convention to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.

—They agreed that Russia and the U.S., as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for arms control and regional security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.

—They firmly supported the efforts of the UN special commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

Statement Issued on U.S., Russian Arms Sales Controls, Policy

LD1401125194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1212 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] [no dateline as received]

Joint Statement on Issues of Export Controls and Policy in the Area of Transfers of Conventional Weapons and Dual-Use Technologies

The secretary of state of the United States of America and the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation underscored the staunch commitment of their countries to efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to enhance global and regional stability. In keeping with the spirit of the new strategic partnership between the United States and Russia the ministers have agreed on development of wide-ranging cooperation in the field of export control. Moreover, they have agreed that all necessary steps in this field be taken expeditiously, and have established a senior-level working group for this purpose, as well as to initiate bilateral cooperation in the areas specified in a memorandum of intent signed this day in Moscow.

The ministers expressed satisfaction with steps taken since the last meeting of the President of the United States and the president of the Russian Federation to eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War, such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which according to the understanding reached by COCOM members will be terminated not later than 31 March 1994. They also welcomed the decision to establish a new multilateral regime for enhancing responsibility and transparency in the transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use technologies. This new arrangement would not be directed against any state or group of states, and would prevent the acquisition of such items for military end uses if the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause for serious concern as determined by the participants of the new multilateral regime.

The United States and Russia, as leading exporters of conventional weapons, military equipment and dual-use technologies, are convinced that additional measures are needed on an international basis to increase responsibility, transparency and, where appropriate, restraint in this area. They expressed their willingness to work with other countries in bringing about the early establishment of a new multilateral regime in order to achieve these objectives, which would supplement existing nonproliferation regimes, in particular through arrangements to exchange information for the purpose of meaningful consultations.

Reporting, Analysis on IAEA-DPRK Inspections Talks

DPRK Refuses Inspections

AU1701202794 Paris AFP in English
1956 GMT 17 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Vienna, Jan 17 (AFP)—Talks resumed Monday between the International Atomic Energy Agency and

North Korea over allowing inspections of nuclear sites, with Pyongyang officials continuing to refuse permission, an IAEA spokesman said.

The talks are due to continue for the rest of the week. "The North Koreans put forward their points of view about future inspections by the IAEA, and we gave further explanations," said the spokesman. [passage omitted]

The spokesman said the IAEA delegation was being led by Demetrios Perricos and that of North Korea by Ho Jin Yun, an advisor to the embassy in Vienna.

Lack of Progress in Third Round Analyzed

SKI901072594 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
19 Jan 94 p 7

[Article by Vienna-based correspondent Han Ki-pung: "No Progress in the Third Round of the Contact Between North Korea-International Atomic Energy Agency"]

[Text] The atmosphere in Vienna, where the North Korean-IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] negotiations over nuclear inspections have been underway for three weeks, is considerably different from the optimistic one in Washington and Seoul have had in early January. Even though the third round of the official working-level contact between North Korea and the IAEA side was held on 17 January, no "green light" was shown, as expressed by the IAEA side. It has been learned that, through steady contacts in New York at the end of last year, the United States and North Korea reached a series of agreements on resuming ad hoc [imsi] and ordinary [tongsang] inspections, on the announcement of the discontinuation of the Team Spirit, on resuming the working-level contact for exchanging the North-South special envoys, and on resuming the third round of North Korean-U.S. talks.

Accordingly, it was expected that the IAEA inspection team would be able to enter the North by mid or late January, at the latest, without any problems.

However, as soon as technical negotiations between North Korea and the IAEA started, North Korea began to behave as though it had forgotten the political agreement. Such an atmosphere makes us believe that the U.S.-North Korean agreement attaches more importance to the beginning of the IAEA-North Korean negotiations to conduct ad hoc [imsi] and ordinary [tongsang] inspections, than to the resumption of full-scale ad hoc and ordinary inspections.

Actually, it is believed at the IAEA that, because the Clinton administration wants to have a diplomatic success, it might make "an early announcement."

The subjects of the three rounds of the official North Korean-IAEA negotiations have been: sounding out mutual positions (on 7 January), delivering the IAEA's technical demand conditions regarding inspections to North Korea (on 10 January), and delivering the North Korean side's position toward the IAEA's demand conditions (on 17 January).

The IAEA side has kept silent about the concrete contents of the negotiations. However, it has been learned that the great stumbling blocks to the negotiations are the scope of the inspections and technical issues. Among the seven nuclear facilities North Korea reported to the IAEA, North Korea has felt particularly nervous about the 5-MW Yongbyon experimental reactor, which is the most important one in clearing North Korea's nuclear suspicion; and a radiochemical laboratory, suspected to be a reprocessing facility. North Korea has assumed the position that it can receive restricted inspections by just allowing the replacement and repair of the existing monitoring equipment. North Korea has claimed that this is enough to guarantee the continuity of the nuclear safeguards accord.

The IAEA holds that the ad hoc inspections are aimed at verifying the accuracy and integrity of the reported facilities, that there is no alternative but to conduct full-scale and unconditional inspections.

Along with this, it has been learned that the issue concerning the number of inspections has yet to be resolved.

Regardless of the level of the political agreement reached between the United States and North Korea, it is certain that North Korea is once again trying to buy time.

North Korea has come to avoid international sanctions by beginning negotiations with the IAEA. It seems that North Korea is employing a two-pronged policy to leave behind a "nuclear suspicion," at the most, during negotiations with the IAEA. This is the very strategy North Korea had employed for the past year. Whenever North Korea has been driven to a corner, it has used a hardline strategy of worsening the situation and benefiting from it. For example, when North Korea was faced with the pressure of special inspections, it withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It will be two years in April since the nuclear safeguards accord was effectuated. However, North Korea has refused to receive even the ad hoc inspection, which is the most basic stage of the inspection, not to mention special inspections. North Korea has diverted the people's focus of attention elsewhere so that they regard even the resumption of the ad hoc inspection as progress in the nuclear issue.

It seems as though North Korea this time thinks it can still buy time. The fourth round of the IAEA-North Korean negotiations may be held on 19 or 20 January. However, it is difficult to expect that North Korea will change its position at once.

North Korea will probably accept full-scale ad hoc inspections at a time when it believes that it can obtain the greatest benefit from the third round of the high-level talks with the United States.

It seems that North Korea has planned it can prevent the issue of special inspections from being a key point in the agenda at the third round of the high-level talks.

Fourth Round of Negotiations Reported

SK1901025694 Seoul YONHAP in English
0241 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Vienna, Jan 18 (YONHAP)—North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are expected to hold a fourth round of negotiations on IAEA inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities on Wednesday, informed sources said Tuesday.

Following a third round of working-level contacts Monday, IAEA Operations Director Demetrius Pericos and Yun Ho-jin, a counselor at the North Korean Embassy, met unofficially Tuesday and agreed to hold a fourth round on Wednesday, the sources said.

The successive meetings could mean that the negotiations are making rapid progress, IAEA sources said, hinting that there could be early inspections.

As a result, they said, the two sides could reach an agreement this week and the IAEA could start inspecting North Korean facilities by 24 January at the earliest.

Or the two sides could work out some sort of agreement early next week so that an IAEA inspection team could enter North Korea by 31 January, the sources said.

This optimistic view comes after an official IAEA evaluation that there was "no green signal" in the third round, but the sources described the atmosphere of the talks as good and said that the two sides managed to narrow their differences.

One IAEA source, who like the others declined to be identified, said that both the IAEA and North Korea shared the opinion that an IAEA inspection, in whatever the form, has to be carried out before the IAEA holds its regular board of governors meeting on 21 February.

In other words, an IAEA inspection team has to go into North Korea in late January or early February in order for the IAEA to submit a report to the Board of Governors for it will take at least two weeks to inspect facilities and another week to prepare the report, the source said.

The IAEA Secretariat, which is giving "political significance" to the February board meeting because it is the start of a new fiscal year for the IAEA, wants to get tangible evidence to show in the negotiations with North Korea, which have been dragging along for more than a year now, the source said.

The Secretariat also likes to reach a kind of interim point with North Korea on inspection "in consideration" of the United States, which has publicly announced its agreement with North Korea.

As for North Korea, the IAEA could expect some sort of "concession" from Pyongyang because North Korea, too, has to demonstrate a positive attitude toward IAEA

inspection in order to keep its negotiations with the United States going, the source said.

Details of the perceived progress being made at IAEA-North Korean negotiations are not known.

But what is known so far appears to be that the two sides have agreed in principle on the need for inspections on seven reported facilities, including the radiochemical laboratory and the 5-megawatt reactor, the source said.

As for differences of opinion on thorny issues such as the IAEA request for the collection of materials from the facilities, the two sides could discuss them so that another inspection team could be dispatched to North Korea later, the source said.

IAEA Team Must See Seven Sites

SK2001021194 Seoul YONHAP in English
0152 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Vienna, Jan 20 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned North Korea that it will not send a team of inspectors unless Pyongyang meets its inspection requirements at the seven declared nuclear sites.

In a fourth working-level meeting, the UN nuclear watchdog agency Wednesday urged North Korea to submit to all inspections as stipulated by the nuclear safeguards pact and explained why they are required.

After the meeting, IAEA Spokesman Hans Meyer said that although North Korea had agreed on many items of inspection that the IAEA had proposed in a meeting Monday, it still balked at a considerable number of items.

The IAEA told North Korea clearly that it would push through the items it refused to accept, he added.

In order for the inspections to be meaningful, North Korea has to meet the detailed and reasonable inspection requirements of the IAEA, he stressed.

The position of the IAEA is that unless North Korea agrees on all the inspections of its seven declared nuclear sites under the nuclear safeguards regime, the IAEA will not send an inspection team to North Korea, and this position has been clearly conveyed to Pyongyang, he said.

The IAEA hopes that North Korea will accept the inspections of its declared nuclear sites as requested, Meyer said.

Commenting on inspections of two undeclared sites in Yongbyon that are suspected of being nuclear waste processing facilities, he said access to these facilities for additional information would be dealt with separately.

The IAEA and North Korea will have another working-level meeting in Vienna next week, an IAEA source said.

North Korea has agreed, in principle, on inspections of its seven declared nuclear sites but refused to accept some inspection items at two problem sites, a radiochemical laboratory and a five-megawatt reactor, such as examination of chemical substances used there, other sources said.

Agreement on Principle of Inspection

SK2201022794 Seoul YONHAP in English
0217 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Berlin, Jan 22 (YONHAP)—The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and North Korea have agreed on the basic principle of a one-time restricted inspection, and the IAEA is expecting an official answer on the sites Pyongyang will open for inspection next week, IAEA Spokesman David Kyd said Friday.

One-time restricted inspection is neither a regular inspection nor a full-fledged inspection, Kyd told YONHAP by telephone. The IAEA totally understands the situation and so it is not demanding a full scope safeguard inspection.

Both sides agree that the purpose of their working-level talks is to try to agree on a one-time inspection to see if there have been any abnormal changes in the status of North Korea's nuclear facilities, but there is a problem on the scope of the inspection, Kyd said.

The IAEA insists that it should inspect all the facilities, and North Korea disagrees.

Remarks by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman berating the IAEA were just an attempt to shift the blame in case the contacts fail to reach an agreement, Kyd said.

He said he believed that North Korea would give an official answer at a diplomatic level next week, and he is waiting for the answer.

Making announcements to the outside world and trying to reach agreement through patient discussions are totally different activities, he said, adding that he did not think North Korea would break off contact with the IAEA.

North Korea may want to say that the IAEA is trying to resume regular inspections, which had been carried out until last year's suspension of nuclear inspection, but that is not true, he said.

The IAEA has an understanding that the resumption of regular inspections should be discussed more.

There is no change in the IAEA's position that it will not send an inspection team until it has a clear agreement with Pyongyang on the scope of the inspection, he added.

Also reached by telephone, Yi Si-yong, the South Korean ambassador to Vienna, said that there was no change in the IAEA's position that North Korea should open all seven declared nuclear sites for inspection according to nuclear safeguards regulations.

Securing continuity of nuclear safeguards in North Korea and carrying out a full-fledged inspection are required by resolutions of the IAEA Board of Directors and general meeting, and the IAEA Secretariat is not in a position to make concessions freely, Yi said.

'Meaningless Inspection' Rejected

SK2401031194 Seoul YONHAP in English
0300 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Paris, Jan. 24 (YONHAP)—Hans Blix, secretary-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said Sunday that the IAEA will reject a meaningless inspection that cannot confirm if North Korea has transferred its nuclear materials since the last IAEA inspection in Yongbyon.

The North Korean nuclear problem is not only the most sensitive issue related to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but the most delicate issue politically also, the French daily LIBERATION quoted him as saying.

If IAEA inspection is always blocked, like in North Korea, the problem is very serious, he said.

North Korea allowed the IAEA to inspect its seven declared nuclear facilities in January last year for the last time before it announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in March.

The IAEA is demanding from North Korea the same inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities as conducted last year, and is discussing inspection of two additional nuclear facilities.

The IAEA is also demanding periodic inspections, Blix said.

It is certain that North Korea did not declare some plutonium although it declared that nuclear facilities in Yongbyon produced a minimal amount of plutonium, he said.

Inspections of the two undeclared nuclear facilities are to confirm if they produced plutonium, but the IAEA is still not sure if it can find how much plutonium was produced from the North Korean nuclear sites.

On the question of whether the IAEA can guarantee that North Korea is not pushing ahead with military nuclear programs after the inspection conditions are met, he said that there are always uncertainties.

Even if the IAEA does inspect the nuclear reactors in Yongbyon, it cannot rule out the existence of secret nuclear facilities, he said.

He said that the monitoring equipment in North Korean nuclear facilities has not been operating for several months because film and batteries ran out and did not rule out the possibility that North Korea extracted nuclear material from the reactors.

North Korea has not allowed the IAEA inspection team to exchange films and batteries of the monitoring equipment since last August.

Nuclear Inspection 'Paralyzed'

BR2401142294 Paris LIBERATION in French
22-23 Jan 94 p 13

[Interview with Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by special correspondent Romain Franklin in Vienna; date not given: "North Korea's Nuclear Program—the IAEA's Headache"—first two paragraphs are LIBERATION introduction]

[Text] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Official Hans Blix explains why Pyongyang's refusal to let inspectors check its nuclear sites is a major problem.

It has now been a year since North Korea's nuclear ambitions sparked a crisis on January 1993, with Pyongyang refusing to let IAEA inspectors carry out a "special inspection" of two nuclear-waste sites. Such an inspection might have provided evidence as to the nature of North Korea's nuclear program; North Korea is thought to be engaged on a program to manufacture nuclear weapons. In March, Pyongyang announced that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which it had signed in 1985, then "suspended" its withdrawal in June, a few hours before it was to become effective. The United States has been trying since last Summer to convince North Korea's Communist regime to rejoin the NPT and to agree to the IAEA's requirements. North Korea recontacted the IAEA last week; however, the agency said on Thursday that Pyongyang still rejected its requirements. The following is an interview with IAEA Executive Director Hans Blix.

Franklin: Is North Korea's attitude especially problematic for the IAEA as well as with respect to the more general issue of nonproliferation?

Blix: I would say that this is the most acute and politically most sensitive nonproliferation issue we have to deal with. The IAEA has been demanding, unsuccessfully so far, that a number of inspections which require additional information and site visits be carried out, and the case has been referred to the Security Council of the United Nations. That the inspection process should be paralyzed in such a manner is quite a serious matter.

Franklin: The CIA says that North Korea could be in possession of up to 12 kilograms of plutonium, enough to make one or two atom bombs. Is that a fact?

Blix: We do not know. The North Koreans have declared they have extracted minimal amounts of plutonium (from their Yongbyon reactor). However, our inspectors have concluded that the amount declared was not the whole picture. This could be very serious if the amounts involved are substantial. It might be possible to get a better idea of such amounts by checking how long the nuclear fuel has

been in place in the reactor—whether it has been in place since the initial start-up or if it has been changed since.

Franklin: What did you hope would come out of the inspection of the two sites Pyongyang has made off-limits?

Blix: Evidence or confirmation of plutonium production there; there is no guarantee that we will be able to determine the amount of plutonium produced, however.

Franklin: If all IAEA requirements are met, will you be in a position to guarantee that North Korea is not working on a military nuclear program?

Blix: There will always be some uncertainty, all the more since inspecting the Yongbyon plant does not in any way rule out the existence of other (clandestine) facilities.

Franklin: Is it still possible to hide an underground nuclear facility from all current detection techniques?

Blix: That must be no easy task.

Franklin: But it is technically feasible?

Blix: In Iraq, we looked for an underground plant...and even though we did not find one, we remain cautious. Never, for any country, do we give a 100-percent guarantee that there is no clandestine nuclear program in operation.

Franklin: Are the cameras installed by the agency on the Yongbyon site still operational?

Blix: None of them is as their film supply is now exhausted.

Franklin: Then, is it possible that fissionable materials might have been taken out of the reactor in the meantime?

Blix: This cannot be ruled out.

Franklin: The United States, acting under a UN mandate, are currently arranging an agreement which would make it possible to reinstate the inspection scheme in North Korea. Some people say this agreement is too advantageous for North Korea. What are your basic requirements?

Blix: We do not intend to carry out any inspection that would not be significant, that is, which would not let us determine whether fissionable materials have been diverted since our previous inspection. The agreement being negotiated would be implemented in two phases, at least. First, we ask to be allowed to carry out the types of inspections we were performing on the seven declared nuclear sites last year. Then we ask for a consultation with the North Koreans on the inspection terms for the two additional [undeclared] sites. Furthermore, such inspections must take place on a regular basis in the future.

Franklin: Does fissionable material smuggling create a new danger?

Blix: This is not a very serious problem. We never found any enriched uranium when investigating the cases brought to our attention by the media. As for plutonium, the amounts involved were minimal. Likewise, we never noted a defection by any nuclear scientist from the former USSR's military machine.

Franklin: What other dangers may arise? Some of your colleagues have referred to the atom bomb as becoming a "poor man's weapon..."

Blix: More and more developing countries are reaching the technological level needed to separate plutonium or enriched uranium. There is a definite overall risk, and what matters is retaining the political will to curtail it.

KCNA Reports Third Round of DPRK-U.S. Talks 'Deadlocked'

*SK1601084394 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0826 GMT 16 Jan 94*

["Nuclear Issue on Korean Peninsula Can Be Solved Only Through DPRK-U.S. Talks"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, Jan 16 (KCNA)—The nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is a matter which can be solved only through talks between the DPRK and the United States in view of its background or its character, says NODONG SINMUN today.

The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula has been raised since the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea against the DPRK and it has become all the more grave matter with continued nuclear threat to the Korean people from the ground, sea and sky with South Korea as the largest nuclear forward base in the Far East, the paper points out, and continues:

The United States is the very one who creates nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula and the DPRK is the victim who is exposed to the nuclear threat for scores of years.

The DPRK and the United States are the parties concerned who are mainly responsible and have authority to settle the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. This matter, therefore, can be solved through dialogue and negotiations between the United States, maker of nuclear threat against us, and the DPRK, a victim.

At the first round of the talks, both sides discussed and agreed on the matters of principle in the solution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula and made public a joint statement, and at the second round of the talks, the sides discussed practical steps to implement the principles agreed upon in the joint statement. Out the third round of the talks has been long deadlocked by moves of the Western insound forces and their followers.

Out of the desire to fundamentally solve on an equal and fair basis the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula, the DPRK side put forward a formula of package dealing

and has consistently made efforts for an agreement at working-level contacts between both sides.

At the 18th DPRK-U.S. contact held on 29 December last year, the sides agreed to discuss in a package deal the issues for a fundamental solution of the nuclear problem.

The DPRK-U.S. contacts show that the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula can be solved in a fair and peaceful way when both sides display the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation.

A fair solution to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula favours the interest of the United States itself.

The lesson of the DPRK-U.S. contacts since the second round of the talks is that the matter can never be untangled by means of resorting to delaying tactics or putting pressure, placing unreasonable precondition and, moreover, the threat and hostile act infringing upon the dignity and sovereignty of the partner of dialogue will lead the situation to a catastrophe.

If the principles already agreed upon between the DPRK and the United States are observed and implemented, the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula would be solved fairly.

Russian Submarines Sales to DPRK Detailed

DPRK To Use for 'Scrap Metal'

*SK1501063594 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
1000 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Text] According to a source from the Russian Naval Forces Command, old submarines will be sold to the DPRK. However, they are unable to be used for military force. They will be disassembled in Japan and used for scrap metal.

Ten Golf II Subs Sold

*SK1701023894 Seoul YONHAP in English
0213 GMT 17 Jan 94*

[Text] Tokyo, Jan 17 (YONHAP)—Russia signed a contract to sell North Korea 10 Golf II class submarines not long after it exported four Fox-Trot class submarines to the communist country, a senior official of the Russian Pacific Fleet Command is quoted as saying in a report by the TOKYO SHIMBUN.

North Korea made the deal at its consulate in Nakhodka with a company that sells submarines it has salvaged from the sea, according to the dispatch from Russian fleet headquarters in Vladivostok.

Although the company has a permit to export submarines under the Pacific Fleet's arms reduction plan, it needs formal approval from the central government to sell intact submarines.

In an abnormal procedure, the submarines are likely to be towed by Russian warships to North Korea to escape inspection by customs officers, the vernacular Japanese paper said.

Once the submarines leave Russian waters, they will be handed over to North Korean ships for the rest of their journey to Chongjin, the daily said.

The Golf II submarines are similar to the Fox-Trot types in size, but excel them in speed and cruising range and can carry three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles.

They were sold for \$130 dollars a ton, with the total 2,126 tons selling at \$276,000. They were initially for sale to a Japanese company, but went to North Korea after the first contract was called off, the TOKYO SHIMBUN said.

The Russian Navy officially confirmed earlier the sale of four Fox-Trot submarines to North Korea, which have reportedly been delivered through a Japanese trader. It added that the sales were under condition that North Korea use the vessels for scrap.

ROK Government Concerned

*SK1701103594 Seoul YONHAP in English
1021 GMT 17 Jan 94*

[Text] Seoul, Jan 17 (YONHAP)—The Foreign Ministry expressed concern Monday [17 January] at Russian sales of submarines to North Korea lest they be used for something other than for scrap.

Paek Nak-wan, director-general for European Affairs, met with Georgiy Toloraya, minister at the Russian Embassy in Seoul, and explained South Korea's interest in the matter and requested Moscow to disclose the scope of the sale.

Latest press reports quoted a senior official at the Russian Pacific Fleet Command as saying Russia signed a contract to sell North Korea 10 Golf II class submarines not long after it exported four Fox-Trot class submarines to the communist country.

The Golf II submarines are similar to the Fox-Trot types in size, but excel them in speed and cruising range and can carry three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles.

Reports said that the sales were under condition that North Korea use the vessels for scrap.

"If these reports turn out all true, I hope that the vessels will indeed be used for scrap only," said Paek, "but we express concern that North Korea might try to use the submarines for other purposes."

Russian Minister Queried

*SK1801032594 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean
2330 GMT 18 Jan 94*

[Text] The government has asked Russia whether the recent foreign news report stating that it has decided to sell additional submarines to North Korea is true.

Paek Nak-wan, director-general for the European Affairs Bureau of Foreign Ministry, called a Russian minister to the ROK to the Foreign Ministry today and asked him to reveal whether the foreign news report stating that Russia had sold the four Fox-Trot submarines to North Korea and that it has recently concluded a contract to sell 10 additional Golf-class submarines to North Korea is true.

Twelve Subs Sold

SK2201010994 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 22 Jan 94 p 2

[Text] Moscow has notified Seoul that it has made contracts to sell 12 decommissioned submarines to Pyongyang and already handed over one to the country under the contract, the Foreign Ministry said yesterday.

Russian Vice Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov met South Korean diplomats in Moscow Thursday and told them the vessels cannot be restored to submarines as they have been completely removed of arms and other equipment.

He also said Russia has obliged North Korea to allow Russians to check, for verification, the disassembling process in the contract, the ministry said.

"From these reports from Russia, the decommissioned submarines being sold to North Korea are believed to be for use as scrap metal," said Paek Nak-hwan, director-general for European Affairs.

When asked by Seoul of its evaluation, Washington also said it saw little possibility that North Korea would acquire submarine technologies through disassembling the vessels, Paek said.

U.S. officials said that North Korea might use some of the disassembled parts for its other submarines but this also might not pose much worries, he said.

Paek said the former Soviet Union had handed over two decommissioned submarines to South Korea's Samsung in 1989 in exchange for some medical equipment.

Samsung conducted a close examination but didn't find any other use of the vessels but as scrap iron at that time, he said.

The former Soviet Union also sold two vessels to Taiwan in 1991 but China did not raise objections, Paek said.

The official said Seoul has demanded an additional explanation from Moscow on how it will check the process of disjoining the vessels.

"We will continue to closely watch future development of the Russia-North Korea dealing," he said.

Report of Russian Nuclear Assistance to DPRK 'Clear Provocation'

PM2701184194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 28 Jan 94 p 1

[Observer Aleksandr Golts report on interview with Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; place and date of interview not given: "General Staff Secret Report" in Fact Blatant Forgery. Chief of Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff Refutes Articles in Japanese Weekly and IZVESTIYA"]

[Text] The popular Japanese weekly SHUKAN BUNSHUN has published material which, if it were true, would cause an international sensation; the respected Russian newspaper IZVESTIYA has given a detailed account of this material. Citing a secret document from the Russian General Staff and an interview with an anonymous staffer from this organization, it is reported that Russia is allegedly assisting the implementation of North Korea's nuclear missile plans. Also, that our nuclear and rocket scientists have helped to develop the nuclear weapons [boyepripyas] which, it seems, the DPRK already possesses as well as the means to deliver these weapons. Moreover, it is claimed that, in the Russian military's assessment, the situation is so grave that the issue of establishing a joint system of ABM defense for Russia, Japan, and the United States needs to be addressed.

But it is probably no accident that neither the actual magazine nor IZVESTIYA has attempted to ascertain whether this document is genuine by making inquiries at its alleged source.

In reply to my question as to whether such a document really exists, Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, answered: "The articles in the Japanese magazine and IZVESTIYA are based on a gross and obvious forgery. It is only to be regretted that such a respected newspaper has fallen victim to forgers by publishing this material from its Japan correspondent Sergey Agafonov without any preliminary verification."

Indeed, it can only be conjectured why the photograph of the first page of the "document" was thought sufficient to remove all doubts as to the authenticity of the report. After all, it is unlikely that IZVESTIYA employs people specializing in the clerical work of the Ministry of Defense who would be able to distinguish a genuine document from a forgery. People who deal with office paperwork, however, are adamant that the Ministry of Defense never uses the kind of document serial numbers indicated in the article. But if this is the case, the ironic questions in the article addressed to the ministry and the General Staff are still left hanging in the air. After all, if no leaks took place, any hint that there is a little key which "opens General Staff safes for Japanese guests" is simply an insult.

However, other questions are now being raised. In particular, what was the point of publishing these unverified reports. Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov believes that "we

are talking about a clear provocation with the aim of casting aspersions on the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff." Can it be that someone actually wants to rekindle the antiarmy campaign of the past few years?

At the same time the chief of General Staff is not ruling out the possibility that this episode has played into the hands of those who want to complicate relations between Russia and North Korea.

Yes, the nuclear problems of the Korean peninsula are currently very acute. Russia is not hiding its alarm at the fact that the DPRK has suspended its participation in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, a ranking Russian diplomat stated recently, we believe that sanctions against the DPRK—on which some countries are insisting—should be used only as a last resort. But there are those who would prefer to replace the complex process of negotiations with open pressure on Pyongyang. And is it not currently in their interests to make it seem as if Russia is to blame for the fact that the DPRK has allegedly acquired nuclear weapons?

Article Reveals Czech Company's Arms Talks With Iran

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[Ivan Lamper article: "Skoda Plzen Denies Arms Contacts With the Iranian Regime; Documents State Otherwise"]

[Text] On Monday 10 January a strange denial was published in *MLADA FRONTA DNES*: "It is out of the question that Skoda Plzen would want to offer Iran the modernized version of the T-72 tank." This statement was issued by Skoda Plzen spokesman Jaroslav Hudec. According to him, he wanted to curb "speculation by some of the media about the visit to Iran by the Skoda director." Until Hudec's statement, however, there had been no hint of suspicion in any Czech or foreign newspaper that Skoda Director General Lubomir Soudek had offered tanks to Tehran. Until now, his trip to Iran has been marked by a completely different scandal: A willingness to supply the regime with technology for its nuclear program. Why did spokesman Hudec decide to deny "speculation" that has so far not occurred to anyone?

The Deputy Minister and the General

The answer is simple. On Friday 7 January *RESPEKT* asked Director General Soudek the following question: "During your visit to Iran at the end of last November, did you hold talks with representatives from the Iranian Defense Ministry and military experts?" As Soudek was unable to reply—apparently, he was too busy—Jaroslav Hudec dealt with the matter: "I am authorized to state on behalf of the director that, while he was in Tehran, he did not hold talks with any of the people you mention." Three days later, the aforementioned denial was issued. Although no specific arms were mentioned in the *RESPEKT* question, Hudec thought it necessary to deny in advance talks about T-72 tanks.

The two negative statements issued by spokesman Hudec are, of course, at variance with a document *RESPEKT* has managed to obtain. This is an internal memorandum from the trip to Iran prepared for select trading partners of Skoda Plzen after the delegation's return home. The following two notes are contained in the comprehensive text:

A Meeting at the Defense Ministry.

Present on the Iranian side: Deputy Minister Vaheed and five members of his staff; the deputy foreign minister.

We briefed them on the RDP Group and its possibilities. We gave them a rough outline, prepared by the RDP Group, of the options for supplying our hardware.

Interest in:

- the new generation of surface-to-air missiles
- Tamara
- the modernization of tanks.

Talks With the Army.

Present: General Rahimi, deputy head of tank production.

The general is an expert on tanks. It was recommended to:

- send him a list of RDP Group shareholders and their military production program (responsible: Engineer Vlcek, deadline 31 December 1993)
- invite representatives from the Iranian Army to a demonstration of the T-72 and other weapons innovations (responsible: Engineer Vlcek, deadline 2/94).

On the basis of a demonstration of the hardware, it is possible to conclude an agreement on the purchase of weapons or on cooperation in the production of weapons systems in components.

The Risk: An Unnecessary Fuss in Advance

Jan Vlcek, the director general of the Czech RDP Group arms consortium, knows nothing about a list of shareholders or about inviting Iranian experts, which he is supposed to arrange. "I have not heard anything about this," he says. "We respect the law and Czech foreign policy." Like Jaroslav Hudec, he also describes all the reports about talks between Soudek's team and Iranian military officials as "mere deduction and speculation."

Trade and Industry Minister Vladimir Dlouhy is more cautious in his judgment. In reply to a written question on whether he had been informed of Soudek's talks at the Defense Ministry in Tehran—either before the visit or after it—he said: "I am only given a brief outline of Mr. Soudek's plans during his foreign visits. I was not informed in advance of any specific contacts in Iran. I was briefed on his talks only after the visit was over."

And the second question was—what do you think of them?

"During all of these negotiations, the RDP Group management exposes itself to the substantial risk that the activities that attract unnecessary attention in advance will come up against a stumbling block—that the government will not grant a license for the anticipated exports."

There is a slight slip here: In the Czech Republic today it is Vladimir Dlouhy's own office and not the government that grants licenses for military contracts. According to a cabinet resolution of May 1993, it must—at the same time—be guided by the point of view of the Foreign Ministry. It, according to its spokeswoman, Lucie Pilipova, only considers trade with countries under the UN Security Council's embargo to be unequivocally prohibited. Despite this, the Cernin Palace apparently also "carefully analyzes" all other requests to export arms and, after weighing the situation, gives its consent or rejects them. Would the Foreign Ministry now permit the export of tanks and missiles to Iran? "It is impossible to give an unequivocal answer to such a hypothetical question that does not concern a specific application for a license," said Pilipova. "I think, however, that, after taking into consideration all the circumstances, our office would be inclined to the view not to permit such exports."

An Element of Human Nature

Jaroslav Hudec has prepared a little show piece for reporters in connection with the discussion on arms production at Skoda Plzen: A copy of the technical design for a saber—"until now, our last arms order"—that Skoda produced 300 of 10 years ago for the Castle Guard. "Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize one thing," says Mr. Hudec apropos of the drawing. "Arms production is an element of human nature. It is a fact of life and we are realists. We are not ashamed of wanting to manufacture special technology. Unfortunately, however, we have found ourselves on the defensive."

It is, of course, hard to determine the true extent of this "defensive." Skoda Plzen is one of the 40 shareholders in the RDP Group arms consortium and, within its framework, it coordinates the program for modernizing the Soviet T-72 tank. "It should be a truly quality tank," said Lubomir Soudek in LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE on 29 September last year. "We will modernize it right on the spot based on verified documentation from Western firms and tried-and-tested engines. I believe there will be a great deal of interest in it. In the near future, I will hold talks with the ministers of national defense of certain states outside Europe. We have to agree on some deliveries."

Now the Skoda spokesman "on behalf of Mr. Soudek" is casting doubt on some of the statements made by his director. In particular, it is—apparently—out of the question that our arms producers could agree with anyone on supplies of the T-72 "in the near future." The entire modernization process is—regardless of the verified documentation and the tried-and-tested engines—in its infancy. The company has only just hired an expert to

determine the course of the project, to prepare the budget, calculations, and so on. Apparently, no one has any details at the moment and nothing will be clear for about two years. The situation is the same with regard to another of the statements quoted—"modernization on the spot." "So far, we do not know how the tank's modernization will proceed," Hudec told RESPEKT. "Mr. Soudek's statement was merely an entrepreneurial idea that has not yet acquired firm contours."

Untrue again, at least as far as Jan Vleck, the head of the RDP Group, is concerned. For him it is a fait accompli: "Country X will simply place an order for the modernization of its tanks and we will go there and carry out the work locally. The state where we will carry out the modernization has to be—naturally—approved by the government."

There is a problem here, however. Today, there are very few countries X that have the "T-72" and that, at the same time, would meet our conditions for arms exports. The only logical customer would be our army. However, the RDP Group management itself admits that, so far, it has not managed to conclude a contract with it. Therefore, if Vleck's company wants to adhere to our state's political line in its business dealings, its stake on the T-72 looks like an inexplicable risk: The markets that would be interested are embargoed and those to which the tank may be exported do not want the product.

According to rival experts from this branch, the answer to the riddle lies in the phrase "modernization on the spot." Instead of provocative and largely unsuccessful attempts to "smuggle" assembled weapons to terrorist countries, this method provides scope for more dignified camouflage: Only parts of these weapons, licenses, and the appropriate know-how can be exported.

Until the Bear Starts Waving His Arms

Of course, tanks and missiles were not the only hot items discussed by the Czech businessmen during their visit to Tehran. Apart from General Rahimi and Deputy Minister Vaheed (the former head of the Iranian intelligence service), the Skoda Plzen director also visited Reza Amrollahi from the Iranian Atomic Commission. A well-known scandal erupted around these talks immediately after the return of Soudek's delegation.

"The Iranian regime is trying to turn Prague into a purchasing center for technology, know-how, and materials that would be denied it elsewhere in the world," wrote the Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ on 5 December and thus provoked an outcry in the domestic and foreign media. The most severe reaction came from North America. "According to the U.S. strategic doctrine, it is necessary to ward off the risk that Iran will produce a nuclear weapon. Germany, after it got its fingers burnt in Iraq and Libya, banned the export of nuclear technology to terrorist states, but people from executive power are trying to get round this ban. And the hungry Czechs want to sell to anyone," wrote THE NEW YORK TIMES three days before the end of the year. The article ended unequivocally: "If Prague

sees its future as a merchant of death, it should be told that it cannot bank on membership in NATO. If the Russian bear again begins waving his arms, whom would the Czechs want to guarantee their security? Will it turn to its nuclear customers in Tehran?"

The domestic press mostly limited itself to quoting the official statements issued by Skoda Plzen. It admitted that negotiations were held on supplying a reactor to Iran, but it denied that it acted as an intermediary for Siemens or Westinghouse. The mass media, the Skoda Plzen spokesman, and some government ministers then repeated several times that Skoda's offer concerns "peaceful technology," which can in no way be used for the production of nuclear weapons. This argument was used recently by MLADA FRONTA DNES on 10 January: "To be slightly cynical, selling the Iranians a reactor just means a good deal to the tune of tens of millions of korunas. It would be hard for the company's management to explain to its shareholders that they had left such an opportunity to the competition."

The Road to Prosperity

The uproar over the nuclear reactor is the second time recently that the world has tried to scuttle Czech-Iranian nuclear cooperation. In June 1993 the secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Prague asked the Foreign Ministry to suspend the contract to supply technology for extracting and processing uranium ore concluded between the Prague company Geoindustria GMS and the Iranian Atomic Commission. The Czech side replied that it was impossible to turn down the deal because it involved "peaceful equipment," but in the end—apparently, thanks to voluntary cooperation from the exporter—the export deal fell through. Last year the GMS company even terminated its work on a geological survey of the uranium deposits in the Anarak and Bandar Abbas regions in Iran.

Skoda Plzen, of course, refuses to make similar concessions in the nuclear business. The pressure to terminate the

contract is, according to it, merely an "unfair move by the competition." The question of who this competition is remains unanswered. In democratic countries today there is no risk of being lost in the crush over orders for the Iranian nuclear program. The Federal Government (under pressure from the United States) prohibited Siemens from undertaking nuclear activity in Iran several years ago and the French Framatome company and—of course—the U.S. Westinghouse company cannot export there either. Skoda has also been criticized in the foreign press not for reasons of "competition," but on the contrary, because—as an alleged intermediary—it enables these companies to conduct prohibited business deals.

At the moment, Iran has a contract with Russia to construct a nuclear power plant (the VVER [water-moderated water-cooled power reactor] type). Russia is also apparently considering whether to complete the half-built (and partly bombed) power plant in Bushehr that had to be abandoned by Siemens. According to Skoda Deputy Director Frantisek Svitak, the Plzen company is interested in participating in—to say the least—the first order as a general supplier via Russia. The point of view of the experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency is unequivocal: A project of this size will give the Iranians considerable experience in reactor engineering and operations. It will be essential to train local experts and to permit the operation of test reactors that, in the long-term perspective, will support the state's nuclear program. Moreover, if Tehran obtains the VVER reactor, this will provide it with enough of an excuse to submit orders for more nuclear technology.

The equally unequivocal point of view of Skoda's senior management stands in opposition to all of this. Spokesman Jaroslav Hudec formulated it as follows in the December issue of the enterprise's magazine SKODOVAK: "Whether people like it or not, our enterprise will not allow itself to be dictated to by anyone who feels entitled to do so. We have our own way of thinking and our own plans for achieving prosperity."

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